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Although tender offers continue to be the most popular method of ac-
quiring control of a corporation, recent times have seen the increasing
use of proxy contests. When a corporate tender offer is followed by a
merger or asset acquisition, the proxy rules are also likely to be of consid-
erable importance.' Whatever might be said with regard to the adequacy
of the disclosure rules under the Williams Act (and much has been said2)
Professor Loss's observation, made as early as 1951, that "[t]he proxy
* Albert E. Jenner, Jr. Professor of Law, University of Illinois. A.B. 1950, Princeton Univer-
sity; LL.B. 1954, Harvard University. The author wishes to express his indebtedness to Neil Fox
and Gregory Bird for their substantial contributions as research assistants.
1. R. SCHRAGER, CORPORATE CONFLICTS: PROXY CONTESTS IN THE 1980's (1986). See 18
SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 441-442 (1986).
2. For a partial bibliography of the literature, see R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, JR., CASES AND
MATERIALS ON SECURITIES REGULATION 630-31, 678 (5th ed. 1982). As the date indicates, the
bibliography is now four years old and an updated version would no doubt be at least twice as
extensive.
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rules are very likely the most effective disclosure device in the SEC
scheme" continues to be a valid appraisal.3 Indeed, the centrality of the
proxy and annual reporting provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 has now been recognized both by the American Law Institute's ill-
fated Proposed Federal Securities Code, and the Securities and Exchange
Commission's adoption of its "Integrated Disclosure System," greatly
simplifying the disclosure required by the Securities Act of 1933 for cor-
porations which are already filing periodic reports pursuant to the Secur-
ities Exchange Act of 1934.1
The law relating to proxy disclosure is of an older vintage than that
which deals with tender offers, but there are still some issues on which
courts continue to differ with respect to proxy regulation. This article
will examine four of these, namely whether, and to what extent, reliance,
causation, materiality and scienter are required for actions under the
proxy rules.
I. RELIANCE
Although courts have continued to require "reliance" in the rule lOb-5
area, except for cases of "pure nondisclosure"5 existing precedent is con-
3. L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 555 (1st ed. 1951). The observation was repeated, in
nearly identical form, ten years later. 2 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1027 (2d ed. 1961) and,
eight years later, the author observed, "The most apparent shortcomings have now been remedied by
the 1964 amendments which not only extended § 14 to many over-the-counter companies but also
solved the non-solicitation problem by adding § 14(c)." 5 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 2984
(2d ed. Supp. 1969).
4. Securities and Exchange Comm. Rel. Nos. 33-6383, 34-18524, 35-22407, 39-700, IC-12264,
AS-306 (Mar. 3, 1982), FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) Spec. Rep. No. 956 (Mar. 11, 1981). See also
Federal Securities Code (1980) (particularly 1 id. at xxvii-xxviii).
5. See Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972). The case has
generally been interpreted as merely creating a rebuttable presumption of reliance in cases of "pure"
nondisclosure (le., cases where there is no misrepresentation or half truth), thus permitting a defend-
ant to establish that even if the fact in question had been disclosed the investor would not have acted
differently, i.e., would have purchased or sold in any event. See, e.g., Zobrist v. Coal-X, Inc., 708
F.2d 1511 (10th Cir. 1983); Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand, 649 F.2d 175 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
455 U.S. 938 (1982); Gower v. Cohn, 643 F.2d 1146 (5th Cir. 1981); Beissinger v. Rockwell Com-
puter Corp., 529 F. Supp. 770 (E.D. Pa. 1981); Dura-Bilt Corp. v. Chase Manhattan Corp., 89
F.R.D. 87 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Panzirer v. Wolf, [1979-80 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
97,363 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); State Teachers Retirement Bd. v. Fluor Corp., 500 F. Supp. 278 (S.D.N.Y.
1980), rev'd and remanded in part on other grounds, 654 F.2d 843 (2d Cir. 1981); Dower v. Mosser
Indus., Inc., 488 F. Supp. 1328 (E.D. Pa. 1980), aff'd, 648 F.2d 183 (3d Cir. 1981); Seiffer v. Topsy's
Int'l, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 653 (D. Kan. 1980). Cf. Cavalier Carpets, Inc. v. Caylor, FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCh) % 91,844 (1 1th Cir. 1984) (plaintiff not entitled to separate jury instructions in action involv-
ing both misrepresentations and failure to disclose, and must therefore show reliance in order to
establish liability). In other words, despite the presumption, the defendant may establish lack of
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fused when it comes to determining the need for "reliance" in connection
causation, i.e., that the plaintiff traded because of something beyond the defendant's control. See,
Wilson v. Comtech Telecommunications Corp., 648 F.2d 88 (2d Cir. 1981) (plaintiff's transaction
motivated by broker's advice); Keirnan v. Homeland, Inc., 611 F.2d 785 (9th Cir. 1980) (purchaser
invested for tax reasons and not due to seller's alleged misrepresentations); Eriksson v. Galvin, 484
F. Supp. 1108 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (purchaser invested to obtain exclusive agency agreement and not
because of alleged misrepresentations); cf. Walsh v. Butcher & Sherrerd, 452 F. Supp. 80 (E.D. Pa.
1978) (dictum, court denying motion for summary judgment, because facts were in dispute). See
Note, The Future of the Reliance Requirement in Private Actions Under SEC Rule lob-5: A Proposal,
9 CUM. L. REV. 721 (1979).
The reliance requirement has been further modified in jurisdictions following the so-called "fraud
on the market" theory by permitting a plaintiff to allege merely that he purchased at the prevailing
market price and relied on the assumption that this price reflected all the publically available infor-
mation and also all information which the defendant had a duty to disclose. See, eg., Levinson v.
Basic, Inc., FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 92,529 (6th Cir. 1986); Lipton v. Documation, Inc., 734
F.2d 740 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 814 (1985); Panzirer v. Wolf, 663 F.2d 365 (2d
Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1107 (1982) (noted in Note, Panzirer v. Wolf- An Extension of the
Fraud-on-the Market Theory of Liability Under SEC Rule lOb-5, 32 CATH. U.L. REV. 695 (1983));
Ross v. BankSouth, N.A., FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 92,526 (N.D. Ala. 1986); Shapiro v. Merrill
Lynch & Co., FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 92,504 (S.D. Ohio 1986); Kafton v. Baptist Park Nursing
Center, Inc., 617 F. Supp. 349 (D. Ariz. 1985); Biben v. Card, [1984-85 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) 92,010 (W.D. Mo. 1985); Rosenberg v. Digilog, Inc., FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
92,274 (E.D. Pa. 1985); In re Nucorp. Energy Sec. Litig., [1982-83 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) c 99,157 (S.D. Cal. 1983); In re Wickes Cos. Sec. Litig., [1982-83 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) v 99,057 (S.D. Cal. 1983); Schlanger v. Four-Phase Sys., Inc., 555 F. Supp. 535
(S.D.N Y. 1982); In re Ramada Inns Sec. Litig., 550 F. Supp. 1127 (D. Del. 1982); Mottoros v.
Abrams, 524 F. Supp. 254 (N.D. Ill. 1981); Barrows v. Forest Laboratories, Inc., [1981-82 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,316 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Abrams v. Johns-Manville Corp.,
[1981-82 Transfer Binder" FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,348 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Stern v. Steans,
[1981-82 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,369 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). Cf Rubin v.
Dickhoner, FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 92,039 (S.D. Ohio 1985) (dictum--court not formally adopt-
ing theory but indicating that it was receiving judicial support and should not be dismissed summa-
rily). The theory has received a limited acceptance by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, which has
permitted a plaintiff to show that but for the defendant's fraud, the securities he purchased would
never have been brought to the market (ie., would never have been issued) and that therefore he
would not have acquired them. Shores v. Sklar, 647 F.2d 462 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
1102 (1983) (noted in Note, Shores v. Sklar.- The Fifth Circuit's New Version of the Fraud on the
Market Theory, 47 ALB. L. REV. 597 (1983); Case Note, Securities Regulation-Reliance Under
Rule lOb-5, 1982 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 209 (1982)); Gibb v. Delta Drilling Co., 104 F.R.D. 59 (N.D. Tex.
1984). See also T.J. Raney & Sons, Inc. v. Fort Cobb, Oklahoma, Irrigation Fuel Auth., 717 F.2d
1330 (10th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1026 (1984) (when Oklahoma law prohibited issuance
of bonds, purchasers were entitled to assume from availability of bonds on market that they were
lawfully issued).
"'Fraud on the market" merely raises a presumption of reliance, which may be rebutted by a
defendant's showing that an investor relied on matters wholly extraneous to the market or would
have traded even if he had known of the facts in question. See HSL, Inc. v. Daniels, [1983-84
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 99,557 (N.D. Il1. 1983); Oklahoma PubI. Co. v. Stan-
dard Metals Corp., 541 F. Supp. 1109 (W.D. Okla. 1982). And even if the plaintiff purchased at an
artificially high price because of the effect of the defendant's misrepresentations on the market, he
Washington University Open Scholarship
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with proxy solicitation. More specifically, need it be shown, for standing
to sue purposes, that the plaintiff "relied" on an allegedly misleading
proxy solicitation in the sense that he either granted or withheld a proxy
because of the misleading solicitation? Although there appears to be an
emerging trend of authority in the direction of not requiring "reliance,"
at least for standing to sue purposes, 6 the courts are by no means unani-
mous on the point.
For example, in Gaines v. Haughton,7 the Ninth Circuit Court of Ap-
might not have been harmed if he could also have sold the securities at the artificially high price;
thus it must be alleged that the market price later fell before the securities could be sold and that the
drop was because the true facts were disclosed. Kennedy v. Nicastro, 517 F. Supp. 1157 (N.D. I11.
1981). See also Fausett v. American Resources Management Corp., 542 F. Supp. 1234 (D. Utah
1982). In Fausett, the court rejected the "fraud on the market" theory since otherwise, "an investor
could recover in some circumstances even though he did not read and rely on the defendants' public
disclosures; ... then no one need pay attention to those disclosures and the method employed by
Congress to achieve the objective of the 1934 Act... [would be] defeated." Id. at 1238. Nonetheless
the plaintiff was entitled to a presumption of reliance which could be rebutted by proof that the
misrepresentations were not material, that an insufficient number of shares was traded on the basis of
the representations to have inflated the market price or that the same investment decisions would
have been made even if the investor had known the true nature of the facts which were misrepre-
sented. For further authorities and discussion, see W. PAINTER, THE FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE
AND CORPORATE DISCLOSURE § 5.07 (1979 & Supp. 1982); Black, Fraud on the Market: A Criti-
cism of Dispensing with Reliance Requirements in Certain Open Market Transactions, 62 N.C.L.
REV. 435 (1984); Fisehel, Use of Modern Finance Theory in Securities Fraud' Cases Involving Actively
Traded Securities, 38 Bus. LAW. 1 (1982); Friedman, Efficient Market Theory and Rule lOb-5 Non-
disclosure Claims: A Proposal for Reconciliation, 47 Mo. L. REV. 745 (1982); Helman, Rule l0b-5
Omissions Cases and the Investment Decision, 51 FORDHAM L. REV. 399 (1982); Note, Fraud on the
Market: An Emerging Theory of Recovery Under SEC Rule 10b-5, 50 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 627
(1982); Note, The Fraud-on-the-Market Theory, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1143 (1982); Note, The Fraud on
the Market Theory: Efficient Markets and the Defenses to an Implied 10b-5 Action, 70 IOWA L. REV.
975 (1985); Note, Securities Regulation: The Fraud-on-the-Market Theory and Its Effect on the Reli-
ance Requirement for a Private Action Under 10b-5, 13 STETSON L. REV. 343 (1984).
6. See, e.g., Cowin v. Bresler, 741 F.2d 410 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Hershfang v. Knotter, 725 F.2d
675 (4th Cir. 1984); Dann v. Studebaker Packard Corp., 288 F.2d 201, 209-11 (6th Cir. 1961); Berg
v. First Am. Bankshares, Inc., [1984-85 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 92,011
(D.D.C. 1985) (holding also that plaintiff must show that other shareholders were misled, even if he
himself was not misled); Bradshaw v. Jenkins, [1984 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1
91,645 (W.D. Wash. 1984); Edelman v. Salomon, 559 F. Supp. 1178 (D. Del. 1983); Fradkin v.
Ernst, [1982-83 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 99,271 (N.D. Ohio 1983); Beebe v.
Pacific Realty Trust, 99 F.R.D. 60 (D. Ore. 1983); Left v. CIP Corp., 540 F. Supp. 857, 865 (S.D.
Ohio 1982); Lynch v. Fulks, [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,831 (D. Kan.
1980); Jones v. National Distillers Corp., 484 F. Supp. 679, 684 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Clayton v. Skelly
Oil Co., [1977-78 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 96,269 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Union Pac.
R.R. v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 226 F. Supp. 400 (N.D. Ill. 1964); cf Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 374
F.2d 627 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 970 (1967) (Rule lOb-5 case); Voege v. American Sumatra
Tobacco Corp., 241 F. Supp. 369 (D. Del. 1965) (same).
7. 645 F.2d 761, 773-74 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1145 (1982).
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peals held that reliance was required when the plaintiff sought the re-
moval of various directors for failure to disclose Lockheed Aircraft
Corporation's fourteen-year practice of bribing various foreign govern-
ments and officials. Since the plaintiff had not alleged that he had actu-
ally granted a proxy based upon the allegedly misleading proxy
solicitation, the district court had dismissed his claim and this was af-
firmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals.8 At least four other district
courts have followed the Gaines holding in this respect.9
To shed some light on the proper resolution of the point, it seems ad-
visable to explore the now familiar body of precedent which forms the
underpinnings of the cause of action under rule 14a-9.
In J.L Case Co. v. Borak, " a plaintiff was held to have a private cause
of action for damages based on a false or misleading proxy solicitation in
connection with a corporate merger. Although the broad basis of the
Court's holding, namely that, since among the chief purposes of the Se-
curities Exchange Act of 1934 is "the protection of investors," this "cer-
tainly implies the availability of judicial relief where necessary to achieve
that result""I may appear somewhat sanguine, at least in the light of the
far more restrictive approach to implied remedies which is the current
fashion,' 2 the holding itself retains its basic integrity. Indeed, although
8. 645 F.2d 761 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1145 (1982).
9. Recchion v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 606 F. Supp. 889 (W.D. Pa. 1985); Summers v.
Lukash, 562 F. Supp. 737 (E.D. Pa. 1983); Flum Partners v. Child World, 557 F. Supp. 492
(S.D.N.Y. 1983); Jacobs v. Airlift Int'l. Inc., 440 F. Supp. 540 (S.D. La. 1977). For earlier decisions,
see 2 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 947 (2d ed. 1961 & Supp. 1969), observing that, of the two
decisions which had required reliance, "one... was based on faulty analysis and the other on none
at all." In a similar vein, some courts have denied relief in Williams Act (i.e. tender offer) cases
when the plaintiff was unable to establish reliance on the defendant's alleged misrepresentation in
tendering his shares. Osofsky v. J. Ray McDermott & Co., 725 F.2d 1057 (2d Cir. 1984); Atchley v.
Qonaar Corp., 704 F.2d 355 (7th Cir. 1983); Susman v. Lincoln Am. Corp., 578 F. Supp. 1041 (N.D.
11 1984).
10. 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
11. Id. at 432. Professor Loss has observed that "the Court reached the right result not for the
wrong reason but for no reason at all." 5 L. Loss, supra note 9, at 2882.
12. See, e.g., Transamerica Mortgage Advisers, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979); Touche Ross
& Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979); Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979) (all
declining to find an implied cause of action in various situations); Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975)
(setting forth the various factors which the court now considers relevant in determining the existence
of an implied remedy and emphasizing the primacy of legislative intent to create a remedy or to deny
one). But see Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375 (1983) (purchaser of securities may
have implied remedy under rule lOb-5 despite express remedies under Securities Act of 1933); Mer-
rill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353 (1982) (finding an implied cause of
action under the Commodity Exchange Act).
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the Borak Court's observation that "[p]rivate enforcement of the proxy
rules provides a necessary supplement to Commission action,"'13 i.e. the
concept sometimes referred to as that of the "private attorney general,"
has not been unquestioned in other contexts,1 4 it seems to have retained
its essential validity in the proxy area.'5
One particularly illuminating observation from Borak sheds additional
light on the need for reliance:
The injury which a stockholder suffers from corporate action pursuant to a
deceptive proxy solicitation ordinarily flows from the damage done the cor-
poration, rather than from the damage inflicted directly upon the stock-
holder. The damage suffered results not from the deceit practiced on him
alone but rather from the deceit practiced on the stockholders as a group.16
Six years later, in Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co. 17 the plaintiffs knew of
the alleged improprieties in the proxy materials and were questioning a
merger as in Borak. The Mills court of appeals considered the essential
fairness of the transaction in resolving the question of whether sharehold-
ers were likely to have been misled by defective proxy solicitation materi-
als. The Supreme Court held that alleged fairness was irrelevant to the
issue of standing to sue, observing that:
[w]here the misstatement or omission in a proxy statement has been shown
to be "material," as it was found to be here, that determination itself indu-
bitably embodies a conclusion that the defect was of such a character that it
might have been considered important by a reasonable shareholder who
was in the process of deciding how to vote....
There is no need to supplement this requirement, as did the Court of
Appeals, with a requirement of proof of whether the defect actually had a
decisive effect on the voting. Where there has been a finding of materiality,
a shareholder has made a sufficient showing of causal relationship between
the violation and the injury for which he seeks redress if, as here, he proves
that the proxy solicitation itself, rather than the particular defect in the
solicitation materials, was the essential link in the accomplishment of the
13. Borak 377.U.S. at 432.
14. See Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975). See also
Friendly, Should We Be Turning Back The Law Flood?, 31 HARV. L. ScH. BULL. 34, 38-39 (1979)
(stating that "[to my mind one of the most damaging phrases ever contributed to American law was
'private attorney general.' It assumes the answer rather than furnishing a reason for it and provides
an odor of sanctity for lawyers who, quite properly, are not thinking of the public at all. After all
these years, if Congress wants to create a private cause of action in enacting regulatory legislation, it
knows how to say so.")
15. See infra text accompanying note 37.
16. Borak 377 U.S. at 432.
17. 396 U.S. 375 (1970).
[Vol. 64:425
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transaction. 18
A synthesis of the reasoning of Borak and Mills then leads to the fol-
lowing tentative conclusion with respect to any supposed requirement of
"reliance" in determining standing to sue:
Since the fundamental purpose of the proxy rules is to promote ade-
quate disclosure in connection with proxy solicitation, he who seeks to
enforce an implied cause of action under the rules need not establish that
he personally was deceived by an alleged violation if he can demonstrate
that other shareholders were misled. Thus if a defect is material in na-
ture so that a reasonable shareholder would have considered it important
in deciding how to vote, 19 there is standing to raise the issue even without
further proof that the defect had a decisive effect on this particular plain-
tiff's decision to grant or withhold a proxy. This approach is not only
consistent with the Exchange Act's purpose to insure shareholder suf-
frage, but also is a necessary supplement to the Commission's role in
carrying out that policy.
Although the Court has restricted the availability of implied causes of
action in other contexts20 and has further circumscribed the cause of ac-
tion under rule l0b-5,2  it has left the rule 14a-9 area unimpaired.22
Aside from the Gaines v. Haughton line of cases,2 3 most later courts
have interpreted the Mills decision either as foreclosing inquiry into reli-
18. Id. at 384-85. The court indicated that although fairness is irrelevant to the question of
standing to sue, it may be taken into account in determining the appropriate remedy. Id. at 386. See
also Shapiro v. Midwest Rubber Reclaiming Co., 626 F.2d 63 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
1079 (1981).
19 TSC Indus. Inc., v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976). For further discussion of the
"materiality" concept, see infra text accompanying note 100.
20. See supra note 12.
21. See, e.g., Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977) (requiring that a plaintiff
establish deceit or nondisclosure; thus if the facts are disclosed, there is no rule 1Ob-5 remedy merely
because the transaction is allegedly "unfair"); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976)
(requiring that a plaintiff establish "scienter" (i.e., something more than ordinary negligence) in a
private damage action); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975) (requiring
that a plaintiff be either a purchaser or seller of securities or be suing derivatively on behalf of a
corporation which purchased or sold securities).
22. Indeed, in one case circumscribing a bidder's remedy under section 14(e) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (the so-called "Williams Act" which relates to certain tender offers and mar-
ket acquisitions of shares), the court went to considerable pains to distinguish the proxy regulation
area, governed by section 14(a) of the Exchange Act, from other areas, such as section 14(e). Piper
v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 41 (1977). See also Schreiber v. Burlington Northern R.R.,
105 S. Ct. 2458 (1985) (requiring a plaintiff to establish manipulation, deceit or nondisclosure in an
action brought to enforce section 14(e)).
23. See supra notes 7-9.
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ance, or, at least, establishing a strong presumption of reliance.24 The
justifying policy reasons for this trend have already been alluded to,
namely the interest each shareholder has in not having other sharehold-
ers misled to his prejudice (as in the merger cases) and the functional role
of shareholders' suits in the proxy area as a necessary supplement to
Commission action.25
As to the first of these two policy justifications, the Sixth Circuit Court
of Appeals held twenty-four years ago:
[T]he right sought to be protected by federal law is the right to full and fair
disclosure in corporate elections. Therefore, it is not important whether or
not the complaining stockholders were deceived-they could suffer equally
damaging injury to their corporate interests merely because other share-
holders were deceived in violation of federal law. Accordingly, they should
be entitled to protect themselves against such violations to the same extent
as if they, themselves, were the direct victims of the unlawful deception.26
The real damage which results from unlawful proxy solicitation "re-
sults not from the deceit practiced [on a shareholder] alone but rather
from the deceit practiced on the stockholders as a group."27 Although,
as has already been pointed out,28 reliance is still at times required in
24. See Selk v. St. Paul Ammonia Products, Inc., 597 F.2d 635, 639 (8th Cir. 1979) ("After
Mills, we are not satisfied that a separate showing of reliance on a material misrepresentation in
proxy solicitation materials can be required."); Browning Debenture Holders Comm. v. DASA
Corp., 524 F.2d 811, 815 (2d Cir. 1975) (in Mills the Supreme Court held "that the broad prophylac-
tic purpose of § 14(a) would be frustrated if plaintiffs were required to prove such specific reliance.");
Hershfang v. Knotter, 562 F. Supp. 393, 397 (E.D. Va. 1983), aff'd, 725 F.2d 675 (4th Cir. 1984);
Jones v. National Distillers & Chem. Corp., 484 F. Supp. 679, 684 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (the Supreme
Court in Mills "established a presumption of reasonable reliance in order to avoid an overly difficult
burden of proof," citing Chris-Craft Indus. Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 374 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973)). This reading of Mills is consistent with the approach taken by the
Court with respect to the reliance requirement in rule lob-5 cases in Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah
v. United States, where the Court held that, at least in cases involving nondisclosure, "positive proof
of reliance is not a prerequisite to recovery." 406 U.S. 128, 153 (1972). In the same manner, the
Court in Mills looked to whether a "reasonable shareholder" would consider a defect in the proxy
solicitation material important. Mills, 396 U.S. at 384. See supra text accompanying note 17.
Hence the focus is not on the plaintiff's behavior or whether he actually relied on the constructive
behavior of other shareholders. The Court viewed this test as being "objective" insofar as it was
designed to "avoid the impracticalities of determining how many votes were affected," and to
"resolv[e] doubts in favor of those the statute is designed to protect" in order to effectuate the broad
remedial purposes of section 14(a). 396 U.S. at 385. Requiring reliance by the plaintiff would ap-
pear to run counter to the these purposes.
25. See supra text acQompanying notes 14-16.
26. Dann v. Studebaker-Packard Corp., 288 F.2d 201, 209 (6th Cir. 1961).
27. See Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
28. See supra note 5.
[Vol. 64:425
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suits under rule lOb-5, there is respectable authority for dispensing with
the element of individual plaintiff reliance if a nonrelying plaintiff can
demonstrate that misrepresentations or failures to disclose were made to
others when a reasonable shareholder would have considered the omitted
or misrepresented fact important enough in determining whether to vote
or part with his shares.29
As the Second Circuit Court of Appeals stated in the rule lOb-5 area in
Vine v. Beneficial Finance Company,30 a nondeceived shareholder:
... would never be in the position of a forced seller were it not for the
fraud. In essence, because of the distinctive nature of the short form
merger procedure, appellee by deceiving A can cause B to become a seller.
When this is all part of a single fraudulent scheme and that scheme is a
classic example of deception of an entire class of Class A public stockhold-
ers, as alleged here, we think the policies of section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5
justify holding that fraud on A is "in connection with" the forced sale by B
... What must be shown is that there was deception which misled Class A
stockholders and that this was in fact the cause of plaintiff's claimed
31injury.
The same analysis is applicable in the section 14(a) area.32 When de-
ceptive proxies lead other shareholders to elect directors who harm the
plaintiff through mismanagement or self-dealing, the District of Colum-
bia Circuit Court of Appeals recently held that it is irrelevant whether
the plaintiff personally relied or did not rely on the proxy materials. 33 If
29. See supra cases cited in note 6.
30. 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 970 (1968).
31. Id. at 635.
32 See Clayton v. Skelly Oil Co., [1977-78 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,269
(S.D.N.Y. 1977). In holding that reliance is not required for actions under SEC Rule 14a-9, the
court stated that "where the charged deception adversely affects the market for a particular stock,
plaintiff's personal reliance on the misstatements and/or omissions may be irrelevant to establish
causation with his injury." Id. at 92,747. Accord Hershfang v. Knotter, 562 F. Supp. 393, 398 (E.D.
Va. 1983), aff'd, 725 F.2d 675 (4th Cir. 1984); Jones v. National Distillers & Chem. Corp., 484 F.
Supp. 679 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
33. Cowin v. Bresler, 741 F.2d 410 (D.C. Cir. 1984). The injury that the plaintiff suffered:
. .was not caused by his individual reliance on deceptive proxy solicitations. Rather, his
claim is that other shareholders elected appellees as directors because they were misled by
the proxy materials. The installation of appellees as directors and their subsequent actions
has [sic] injured appellant. This injury is totally divorced from any reliance, or lack of
reliance, on Cowin's part and falls precisely into the scope of injury Congress sought to
protect. Borak, 377 U.S. at 432, 84 S. Ct. at 1559. Requiring reliance in these circum-
stances would serve no legitimate policy and we decline to do so."
Id. at 427. But see Kas v. Financial Gen. Bankshares, Inc., 617 F. Supp. 288, 291-92 (D.D.C. 1985)
(dictum, assuming, in apparent ignorance of the Cowin case, and with virtually no discussion, that
reliance is required).
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reliance is required for standing purposes, a nonrelying shareholder who
is injured is left without a remedy and must rely on "the other sharehold-
ers [who were] beguiled [and who] belatedly become enlightened."'34
Although the concept of a private "enforcement proceeding" has lost
some vitality in recent years, it continues to have some validity in the
proxy area." A shareholder has a legitimate interest in precluding
others from being misled to his disadvantage. Thus enforcement of sec-
tion 14(a) depends in large part upon the initiative of private investors,
especially those with knowledge and sophistication, to police the quality
of management solicitations so as to protect investors generally. Indeed,
it is for this reason that the Mills court held that successful plaintiffs
would be entitled to an interim award of attorneys' fees. A requirement
of individual reliance seems curiously out of step with this broad prophy-
lactic interpretation of the nature and function of the proxy rules. In two
more recent and relatively restrictive holdings in the rule lOb-5 and Wil-
liams Act areas, the Supreme Court in Blue Chip Stamp v. Manor Drug
Stores36 and Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc. 37 explicitly reaffirmed
the language in the earlier Borak decision "concerning the necessity for
supplemental remedies without which congressional protection of share-
holders would be defeated.", 38
Similarly in Alyeska Pipeline Service Company v. Wilderness Society,39
in which the Court rejected the "private attorney general" concept as a
general proposition without explicit congressional authorization, the
Court specifically cited Mills as an exception. Mills was an example of
the historic power of a court of equity:
... to permit the trustee of a fund or property, or a party preserving or
recovering a fund for the benefit of others in addition to himself, to recover
his costs, including his attorneys' fees, from the fund or property itself or
directly from the other parties enjoying the benefit. That rule has been con-
sistently followed .... 40
34. Lynch v. Fulks, [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 97,831, at 90,134 (D.
Kan. 1980). See also Edleman v. Salomon, 559 F. Supp. 1178, 1185 (D. Del. 1983); LefT v. C.I.P.
Corp., 540 F. Supp. 857, 865 (S.D. Ohio 1982); cf Voege v. American Sumatra Tobacco Corp., 241
F. Supp. 369, 375 (D. Del. 1965) (rule lOb-5 case).
35. See supra text accompanying note 16.
36. 421 U.S. 723, 730 (1975).
37. 430 U.S. 1, 25 (1977).
38. Id. See also the more recent holding in Bateman Eichler, Hill, Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 105
S. Ct. 2622, 2628 (1985) (referring in turn to the Borak and Blue Chip decisions).
39. See supra note 14.
40. Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 257-58.
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Finally, the argument that the private attorney general concept sur-
vives in the section 14(a) area is reinforced by the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals decision in Reiser v. Del Monte Properties Co.41 In Reiser, the
plaintiffs objected to proxy statements issued in support of a proposed
merger between Del Monte and a subsidiary company. After the plain-
tiffs filed a section 14(a) suit, the directors of Del Monte postponed the
shareholders' meeting, withdrew the original proxy statement, and issued
a new proxy statement. Plaintiffs then requested attorneys' fees, but the
district court denied the request on the grounds that an award of fees
under Mills was only proper if the section 14(a) action was brought as a
class action or a derivative suit, and that an award of fees in this case was
precluded by Alyeska. 42 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed,
and held that an award of fees to a successful section 14(a) plaintiff was
proper even if the suit was not a class action or a derivative suit. The
court noted that in Alyeska, the Supreme Court specifically approved of
the "common benefit" exception to the rule generally followed by Ameri-
can courts, requiring a plaintiff to pay his own attorney's fees, that was
applied in Mills.43 Even though the plaintiff in Mills sued in a represen-
tative and derivative capacity, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals did
not think this fact to be significant:
The [Mills] Court focused on the beneficial effect of the suit and the equita-
ble reasons for shifting the expenses of litigation to the shareholders. The
crucial factor in Mills was that the suit had resulted in correction of a "de-
ceit practiced on the stockholders as a group," thereby rendering an impor-
tant service to the shareholders. [citation omitted] . . . "[B]y vindicating
his own right, the successful litigant dispels the 'chill' cast upon the rights
of others."...
The form of suit is not a deciding factor; rather, the question to be deter-
mined is whether a plaintiff, in bringing a suit either individually or repre-
sentatively, has conferred a benefit on others. To suggest that an individual
suit which corrects a violation of the proxy statutes is less beneficial than a
class action accomplishing the same result would be to disregard the effect
of the suit. 44
Reiser stands for the proposition that section 14(a) plaintiffs suing in a
41 605 F.2d 1135 (9th Cir. 1979). This is the same court which later required reliance in
Gaines v. Haughton, 645 F.2d 761, 773-74 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1145 (1982). For
discussion of Gaines, see supra text accompanying note 7.
42. Reiser, 605 F.2d at 1136-37.
43. Id. at 1139.
44, Id. at 1139-40 (citations omitted).
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private capacity continue to serve the "policing" function set out for
them in Borak and Mills. Whether this function is characterized as a
"private attorney general" or not is irrelevant. Therefore reliance should
not be required for standing purposes, for to do so would defeat the pur-
poses of section 14(a) by denying standing to those who are in the best
position to enforce the proxy rules.
II. CAUSATION
As might be expected, courts have had to address the problem of cau-
sation in the proxy regulation area. Once Borak established that there
was implied civil liability under rule 14a-9, a corollary was that a plaintiff
could sue only if he could establish a causal link between the alleged
harm and the statutory violation. Situations where such a casual connec-
tion was ill-defined or lacking altogether were left for appropriate Com-
mission enforcement proceedings.45
Although it is theoretically possible to define causation in strict logical
terms of "but for," courts have required a more definite linkage by re-
quiring proximate causation.46 In the context of proxy regulation, it is
arguable that a shareholder should be able to recover for all harmful acts
engaged in by a board of directors which was unlawfully elected due to a
misleading proxy solicitation in connection with an annual shareholders'
meeting. However, to do so would federalize entire areas of misconduct
which normally would be dealt with at the state level and would burden
federal courts with a disproportionate share of the workload. 47 Thus,
courts have generally required a plaintiff to establish that the transaction
forming the basis of the suit and allegedly causing immediate harm to
him was itself subject to shareholder approval and that the allegedly mis-
leading proxy solicitation occurred in connection with that transaction
and not solely with a prior election to the board of directors.
45. A rule 14a-9 violation should not be without consequences merely because it is difficult to
establish harm to some individual investor. Although the Commission is required to establish mate-
riality, and possibly scienter in those few jurisdictions which may follow the minority view that
scienter is required (see infra text accompanying note 189), it need not establish that any particular
investor was harmed but only that the violation has a propensity to harm investors generally. See
TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976); Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396
U.S. 375, 384 (1970).
46. See generally W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 244-70 (4th ed. 1971).
47. Similar policy considerations have prevailed in the rule lob-5 area. See Santa Fe Indus.,
Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977). Cf Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723
(1975).
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A. Election of Directors
When materials soliciting proxies for the election of a slate of directors
contain material misrepresentations or nondisclosures, courts have found
the proxy solicitations to be essential causal links to the elections and, as
with challenges to mergers or other transactions requiring shareholder
approval, plaintiffs in such cases can seek appropriate equitable relief.
This is so even when the underlying reason why the plaintiff is bringing
the suit is related to other improper acts committed by the directors-
acts not subject to shareholder approval. For example, in Weisberg v.
Coastal States Gas Corp.,48 the Coastal States Gas Corporation (Coastal)
and its directors allegedly paid over eight million dollars in bribes to for-
eign oil company officers. The plaintiffs argued that the defendants vio-
lated section 14(a) because they failed to disclose the bribes in proxy
solicitation materials for the election and re-election of Coastal's board of
directors between 1974 and 1978. The plaintiffs sought only equitable
relief and asked that the elections of those years be set aside, for the
appointment of a receiver and for new elections. The district court dis-
missed the case on the ground that the claim did not "satisfy the transac-
tion causation requirements" set out in Mills.4 9 The court followed a
prior district court holding5" in which, in an analogous situation, the
plaintiff was seeking to set aside an election of directors because of sec-
tion 14(a) violations arising from a failure to disclose foreign bribes.
Both district court decisions were reversed, however. As the Second Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals in reversing Weisberg noted, the plaintiff was not
seeking damages suffered by him or by the corporation because of the
improper payments that were not subject to shareholder approval. In-
stead, "the challenged 'transaction' is the election of the directors, and
we have no doubt that the proxy solicitation itself ... was an essential
link in the accomplishment of that transaction, within the meaning of
Mills."5
1
In Gaines v. Haughton,52 another leading Ninth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals case, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant directors of Lockheed
48. 609 F.2d 650 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 951 (1980).
49. See Weisberg v. Coastal States Gas Corp., 609 F.2d at 652.
50. In re Tenneco Sec. Litig., 449 F. Supp. 528 (S.D. Tex. 1978).
51. Weisberg, 609 F.2d at 654 (remanding the case for the district court to determine if the
failure to disclose the bribes was a material omission). See also Galef v. Alexander, 615 F.2d 51, 65-
66 (2d Cir. 1980) (in which the defendant directors allegedly harmed the corporation by self-dealing
involving employee stock options).
52. Gaines v. Haughton, 645 F.2d 761 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1145 (1982).
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Corporation violated the proxy rules by failing to disclose payments of
thirty to thirty-eight million dollars to foreign governments and officials
between 1961 and 1975. The plaintiff sought no damages under section
14(a), but instead sought a declaration invalidating past elections, re-
moval of directors, and other equitable relief that included money dam-
ages under California law. As in Weisberg, the court distinguished
between claims for money damages arising out of defendants' failure to
disclose misconduct in proxy solicitation materials and claims for equita-
ble relief relating to the election of directors, "alleged to have been facili-
tated by the nondisclosure of the underlying misconduct."53 In the
former situation, relief would be denied because of a lack of transactional
causation since the payments did not require shareholder approval. But
with the equitable claims against the past elections, the Gaines court held
that causation would be assumed if the nondisclosure of the bribes was
material.54
The precise scope of the relief to be granted once a section 14(a) viola-
tion is found in cases such as Weisberg or Gaines is somewhat unclear.
Most of the opinions arise from motions for summary judgment on sub-
stantive issues and do not fully explore the final shape of the appropriate
remedy; in many instances, other defects in the plaintiffs' case do not
allow the case to proceed to the remedy stage. For example, in Gaines,
even though the court found causation, it went on to hold that the non-
disclosure of the bribes was not material.55 In Weisberg, on remand, the
plaintiffs engaged in discovery and failed to find any evidence to support
allegations of kickbacks or scienter, subsequently settling with Coastal
and its directors. It is worth noting that the plaintiff's attorneys received
over $200,000 in fees as part of the settlement, a possible motivation for
bringing the suit in the first place.56
Despite some uncertainties, if the suit occurs prior to the directors'
election, plaintiffs can obtain an injunction against voting proxies ob-
tained through misleading solicitations.57 If the suit occurs after the
election, a plaintiff can have the challenged election set aside, a receiver
appointed, and a new election held. These are the remedies suggested,
53. Id. at 775-76.
54. The Court distinguished between bribes connected with kickbacks-presumptively mate-
rial-and "mere" bribes not connected to kickbacks-presumptively immaterial. Id. at 776-77.
55. Id. at 779.
56. See Weisberg v. Coastal States Gas Corp., [1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 98,716 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
57. See, e-g., Cooke v. Teleprompter Corp., 334 F. Supp. 467 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
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although not actually ordered, in Weisberg and Gaines.58 Once the court
has jurisdiction and can order the rescission of past elections, it may also
be able to exercise pendent jurisdiction over any state claims the plaintiff
may have for damages arising from the underlying corporate wrongs the
defendants may have committed.59
B. Damage Actions and Transaction Causation
Suppose directors A, B, and C make illegal bribes and receive kick-
backs in 1978, and fail to disclose the bribes and kickbacks in proxy
materials for their reelection in 1980. If a shareholder can sue to set
aside the 1980 elections under section 14(a), can the shareholder also
recover the bribes and kickbacks? Similarly, if the same directors in 1981
make further bribes and receive more kickbacks, or if they engage in
some other wrongful activities, such as improperly borrowing money
from the corporation, if plaintiffs succeed in having the 1980 election set
aside may they also recover the post-election damages on the theory that
full disclosure in 1980 would have prevented the directors from being
reelected and thus would have prevented the post-1980 losses?
Courts have generally denied recovery in both of these situations in
part because they view section 14(a)'s protection as extending only to
those transactions directly subject to shareholder approval. As the
Supreme Court noted in Mills, section 14(a)'s purpose is to insure that a
shareholder would be informed about the transaction for which "author-
ity to cast his vote is sought."'  Shareholders only vote on fundamental
corporate changes, such as mergers or the election of directors, and not
on ancillary transactions, such as the bribes, kickbacks, excessive sala-
58. See also Smillie v. Park Chem. Corp., 466 F. Supp. 572 (E.D. Mich. 1979).
59. See infra text accompanying note 96.
60. Mills, 396 U.S. at 381. For discussion of Mills and of the causation requirement, see Elson,
The Meaning of J.1. Case Co. v. Borak-Remedies Available for Violation of Proxy Rules Under the
Federal Securities Act, 23 Sw. L.J. 609, 614 (1969); Note, Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Company:
Proxy Violations-The Causation Question and the Award ofAttorneys' Fees, 65 Nw. U.L. REV. 854
(1970); Note, Causation and Liability in Private Actions for Proxy Violations, 80 YALE L.J. 107
(1970); Comment, Securities Regulation-Proof of Causation Under Section 14 of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934-Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 11 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 1024 (1970);
Comment, Judicial Encouragement of Private Actions Under Rule 14(a)-9, 50 B.U.L. REV. 470
(1970); Comment, Securities Exchange Act of 1934-Section 14(a)-9-Causation, 21 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 787 (1970); Comment, Securities Regulation-Shareholder Derivative Suits Under Rule 14a-9, 49
N.C.L. REV. 215 (1970); Comment, Causation-Attorneys' Fees and Section 14(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 36 Mo. L. REV. 133 (1971). See also 5 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION
2934-39 (Supp. 1969).
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ries, or improper loans. Therefore, such other transactions do not fall
within the protection of section 14(a) and they are more properly reme-
died by actions under state law. This requirement has been called "trans-
action causation"'" although strictly speaking courts are not referring to
"causation" in any physical sense but using the term as a short-hand
description to limit section 14(a) liability, delimiting a point where, as
with proximate cause in tort law, courts will deny recovery.
As for the undisclosed transactions that occur prior to the election, the
bribes and kickbacks in 1978 in the foregoing example, the unwillingness
of courts to award damages is not solely due to a desire to limit the reach
of section 14(a). Rather, in this instance, there is no causation in fact
between the lack of disclosure in the 1980 proxy materials and the prior
questionable transactions. The proxy solicitation occurred after the
bribes and the kickbacks, after the damage had been done. Thus, it can-
not be said to be a cause of the earlier misconduct, even under the looser
"but-for" test.62
Although the misleading proxies were a "cause," in a technical "but-
for" sense, of thepost-proxy misconduct, courts have denied recovery for
later misconduct because of a decision to cut off legal liability and to
limit section 14(a) actions only to instances when shareholder approval
was sought for the challenged transaction. This is the case both when the
later misconduct is totally unrelated to the proxy defect (i.e., the proxy
materials fail to disclose past bribes and the directors then pay them-
selves excessive salaries) and when the later misconduct grows out of the
proxy error (i.e., the proxy materials fail to disclose past bribes and the
reelected directors continue to make bribes after the election).
Thus most courts have held that if corporate directors bribe foreign
officials, their failure to disclose these payments in the proxy materials
for their reelection will not support a damage action under section 14(a)
61. Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 507 F.2d 374, 380 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421
U.S. 976 (1975).
62. See Kamerman v. Pakco Cos. [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 96,318,
at 93,066 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (the determination of no section 14(a) liability for damages caused after
an improper election "is not varied should plaintiff's theory be that he is entitled to recover funds
misspent prior to the fraudulently induced elections. That is, to the extent that the 1973 proxy was
materially deficient in its failure to reveal de facto director Colasurdo's 1972 depredations, the com-
plaint would nonetheless fail to state a claim... Section 14 cannot be interpreted so expansively as
to provide for recovery for activities which were not the subjects of the proxy solicitation"). See also
Lewis v. Valley, 476 F. Supp. 62 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (no transaction causation when defendants alleg-
edly failed to disclose foreign payments in connection with seeking authorization of executive
compensation).
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to recover the money lost or any fines imposed because of the illegal con-
duct. For example, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that:
Any injury to ... shareholders from the corporation's illegal foreign pay-
ments stems directly from the corporate waste and mismanagement in-
volved in authorizing those payments and not from allegedly misleading
proxy solicitations.... Plaintiff's § 14(a) claim is at best marginally related
to the federal policies underlying that section.
63
Similarly, a plaintiff cannot recover damages under section 14(a) be-
cause directors fail to disclose their corporate mismanagement in the
proxy materials soliciting votes for their election. If, for example, the
directors have a secret policy of not considering or discussing mergers
and acquisition proposals, and fail to disclose this in the proxy materials
soliciting reelection, a shareholder who is later harmed because of a buy-
out of the shares of an insurgent shareholder group, after a fierce take-
over battle, cannot recover damages under section 14(a).64
A failure to disclose past breaches of fiduciary duty and self-dealing in
proxy materials will not support damage actions under section 14(a)
based on a continuation of such practices after the election. 65 Similarly,
63. Abbey v. Control Data Corp., 603 F.2d 724, 732 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1017
(1980). Accord Gaines v. Haughton, 645 F.2d 761, 775-76 (9th Cir. 1981), cerL denied, 454 U.S.
1145 (1982) ("the directors' failure to disclose the questionable foreign payments (or other alleged
misconduct) is not the legal cause of the pecuniary loss to the corporation, if any"); Limmer v.
General Tel. & Elec. Corp., [1977-78 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,111, at 92,002
(S.D.N.Y. 1977) ("[tlhis is not to ignore plaintiffs' argument that defendants could not have contin-
ued to engineer the illegal diversions of GT&E funds alleged herein had they not been reelected to
their directorships pursuant to the accused proxy statements.... This Court concludes, rather, that
the connection between the exercise of corporate suffrage and the acts of waste from which plaintiffs
seek relief is too tenuous to support 'federal intervention in a cause of action otherwise squarely
posited in violations of state law' "). See also Rosengarten v. International Tel. & Tel., 466 F. Supp.
817, 827 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Levy v. Johnson [1976-77 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
95,899 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
64. Brayton v. Ostrau, 561 F. Supp. 156, 166 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
65. See Sanders v. Thrall Car Mfg., 582 F. Supp. 945, 956-57 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), aff'd, 730 F.2d
910 (3rd Cir. 1984) (plaintiff's damage caused by later tender offer transaction, not by defendant's
earlier failure to disclose true intentions to harm corporation when soliciting votes for board of
directors); United Canso Oil & Gas Ltd. v. Catawba Corp., 566 F. Supp. 232, 237-38 (D. Conn.
1983) (plaintiff in a derivative suit cannot recover damages caused by 26 years of improper relation-
ships with another company and breach of fiduciary duty by directors: "It is quickly apparent that
none of these transactions were in themselves the subject of shareholder approval, rather the only
shareholder involvement was in the election of the directors who carried out the transactions. Plain-
tiffs have not been able to cite one case in which transaction causation was found between defects in
proxy statements made in connection with the election of corporate directors and transactions con-
ducted by the board subsequent to their election."); Brayton v. Ostrau, 561 F. Supp. 156, 163-64
(S.D.N.Y. 1983) (plaintiff's shares decreased in value after management was forced to purchase
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when proxy statements failed to reveal a defendant's de facto control
over a corporation, his influencing docile directors to loot the corpora-
tion's treasury through false billings for illusory services, improper loans,
and other improprieties, section 14(a) would not support a damage ac-
tion, either for damages caused before or after the elections.66
As the court stated in Bloom v. Bradford:
The web of causation is infinite, and in one sense everything is connected to
everything else. But to impose liability for an act or omission what dam-
ages it "caused" in a legal sense must be determined on pragmatic grounds,
considering both the foreseeable consequences of the dereliction and its fair
relationship to the eventual loss .... 67
In all of these cases there is concern that any charge of corporate
wrongdoing or mismanagement can become actionable under section
14(a) simply because the directors failed to disclose it, or even their in-
tention to commit wrongful acts, in the proxy solicitation materials for
their election or reelection.68 In addition, there is judicial concern about
defendant insurgent shareholder group's shares after a close proxy fight for control of the board of
directors; harm to plaintiff was not "transactionally caused" by defendant insurgent group's failure
to state true intentions in proxy solicitation materials).
66. Kamerman v. Pakeo Cos. [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,318 at
93,065-66 ("Although such depredations might well have been avoided had the proxy statements
accurately reflected Colasurdo's true relationship to Pakco, his malfeasance has not, within the
meaning of Section 14, been 'caused' by the fraudulent elections of a docile board of directors"). See
also Rosenbaum v. Klein, 547 F. Supp. 586, 588-90 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (breach of trust and self-dealing
by trustees of real estate investment trust not caused by failure to inform shareholders of these
activities in election proxies); Issen v. GSC Enterprises Inc., 522 F. Supp. 390, 396 (N.D. II. 1981)
(harm to plaintiff caused by defendants' failure to disclose improper corporate loans to themselves
not related to deficient earlier proxies for defendants' election which did not disclose true financial
situation of company); Zilker v. Klein, 510 F. Supp. 1070, 1074 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (failure to reveal, in
proxy statements for three elections, directors' self-dealing and other improprieties with subsidiary
not cause of later expenses incurred because of directors' relationships with underworld figures:
"Section 14 actions cannot be grounded on allegations that directors, elected by proxies thus tainted,
thereafter during their term of office carried out transactions harmful to their corporations."); Bloom
v. Bradford, 480 F. Supp. 139, 147-48 (E.D.N.Y. 1979) (claim under Section 20(a) of Investment
Company Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-20; failure to disclose in proxy materials soliciting approval for in-
vestment advisory contract for open-end investment company an investment advisor's family's con-
trolling interest in a particular corporation held not to be causally related to subsequent negligence
in investing of funds in that corporation); Halle & Stieglitz v. Empress Int'l, Ltd., 442 F. Supp. 217
(D. Del. 1977) (nominees for directors failed to disclose alleged plan to make tender offer for corpo-
rate shares; court held that there was no federal cause of action although there might be relief at the
state level).
67. Bloom v. Bradford, 480 F. Supp. 139, 148 (E.D. N.Y. 1979).
68. See, e.g., United Canso Oil & Gas Ltd. v. Catawba Corp., 566 F. Supp. 232, 238 (D. Conn.
1983) ("Under this theory all directors accused of continuing state law improprieties would be sub-
ject to a federal cause of action under § 14(a) for failure to disclose the improprieties in proxy state-
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"bootstrapping" or attempts to "dress-up" state claims into section 14(a)
violations merely by alleging a failure to disclose in proxy materials the
state law violations the plaintiff wishes to attack.69 Courts have objected
to this trend on a number of grounds.
Federalizing all corporate misdeeds through section 14(a) is intellectu-
ally cumbersome. Instead of challenging waste or breach of fiduciary
duty head-on, plaintiffs must shape their claims to fit the proxy rules. In
addition, as one court stated, requiring management to accuse itself of
antisocial or illegal conduct, or even illicit intent, in each proxy solicita-
tion for each election "is simply contrary to human nature."'70
Although it is arguable that permitting section 14(a) suits in these situ-
ations would serve as a deterrent to questionable conduct and would also
promote more conscientious preparation of proxy materials, there is a
more powerful countervailing policy-to avoid the federalization of state
corporate law without express congressional approval, especially when
diversity between state laws has traditionally been the case.7 1 If there is a
need for development of more uniform federal standards of fiduciary
duty, possibly ones not subject to the troublesome state law "business
judgment" rule,7 2 then this should be done by Congress and not by judi-
cial extension of section 14(a) to cover a corporate "universe" of wrong-
doing which traditionally has been remedied under state law.73
ments because "'but for" this failure they might not have been reelected to continue their
misdeeds."); Brayton v. Ostrau, 561 F. Supp. 156, 163 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (if plaintiffs' argument of
broad causation is adopted "alleged violations of state fiduciary law on the part of successful (or
unsuccessful) corporate nominees subsequent to a deceptive proxy solicitation could nearly always
be characterized as a violation of the federal securities law").
69. See, e.g., Maldonado v. Flynn, 597 F.2d 789, 796 (2d Cir. 1979).
70. Amalgamated Clothing & Textile Workers Union v. J.P. Stevens & Co., 475 F. Supp. 328,
331-32 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), vacated for mootness, 638 F.2d 7 (2d Cir. 1980) (shareholder labor union
accused directors of section 14(a) violations for failure to disclose their anti-union activities in proxy
materials for their reelections).
71. See Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977). See also Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66,
84 (1975), where the court had earlier stated:
Corporations are creatures of state law, and investors commit their funds to corporate
directors on the understanding that except where federal law expressly requires certain
responsibilities of directors with regard to stockholders, state law will govern the internal
affairs of the corporations.
72. See generally Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471 (1979); Galef v. Alexander, 615 F.2d 51, 62-64
(2d Cir. 1980) ("In short, we conclude that to the extent that a complaint states claims against
directors under § 14(a) upon which relief may be granted, federal policy prevents the summary
dismissal of those claims pursuant to the business judgment of those defendant directors").
73. See Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. at 462, 480 (1977).
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C. Mootness Defense
One potential problem for plaintiffs in these cases, even if they can
prove all elements of a section 14(a) action, is the problem of mootness.
For instance, assume a slate of directors-A, B, and C-is elected in
1980 for three-year terms. In the proxy materials soliciting votes for
their election, they fail to disclose that they received illegal kickbacks
from overseas bribes during their prior terms. The plaintiff, on discover-
ing the kickbacks, ifies a section 14(a) action in 1982, seeking to rescind
the 1980 election on the ground that the failure to disclose the receipt of
illegal kickbacks was a material omission. While the case is being liti-
gated, the directors come up for reelection in 1983. Directors A and B
choose not to run and retire. New nominees are proposed to take their
place. Director C runs for reelection, discloses the pending lawsuit in the
proxy solicitation materials, and is reelected by a 99 percent vote. When
plaintiff's suit is finally decided, the defendant directors move to dismiss
the case because of mootness, claiming either that full disclosure has
since been made and the director was reelected or that the other defend-
ants no longer serve on the board of directors, their terms having ex-
pired, and arguing that rescinding the 1980 election would be
meaningless gesture.
Of course, if the directors' terms are not yet up and new elections can
be held, or if the defendants are serving new terms but no disclosure has
been made, mootness is not an issue.74 But, when this is not so, as in the
foregoing example, the courts have not provided much guidance. On the
one hand, Gaines and Weisberg seem to suggest that equitable relief may
be granted against past elections, even when the terms of office have al-
ready expired." On the other hand, a number of courts have held or
suggested in dicta that cases are moot if directors elected in the contested
elections are no longer on the board of directors or if they have since
been reelected.76
74. See Maldonado, 597 F.2d 789, 797 n.10 (2d Cir. 1979).
75. The Court in Weisberg stated, however, that it "need not consider whether any of the
claims against individual directors are now moot." 609 F.2d at 655 n.5.
76. See Browning Debenture Holders Comm. v. DASA Corp., 524 F.2d 811 (2d Cir. 1975). In
Browning, plaintiff sought a declaration that an election in 1972 was void. The court held that not
only was it impossible to hold the 1972 election over again, but also officers elected in 1972 had
served their terms of office and had been reelected in 1973 and 1974. A declaration of illegality in
this context, the court held, "would not change anyone's behavior and would be an empty exercise
resulting, at most, in a judicial declaration of no practical import." Id. at 814, 816. See also Galef v.
Alexander, 615 F.2d 51, 66 n.23 (2d Cir. 1980) ("[w]e note also that there may be a problem of
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One may question the propriety of the cases finding mootness. Surely,
a mere declaration of past wrongdoing serves some valid purpose and is
no less superfluous than the requirement that even majority shareholders
should abide by the proxy rules. A declaration of past wrongdoing may
also have an effect on future elections or battles for corporate control.
The prospect of plaintiffs collecting attorneys' fees may alone be a suffi-
cient deterrent to future misconduct, even if past elections can no longer
be reheld. Dismissing cases on mootness grounds would seem to reward
corporate defendants for delaying litigation, since they need only delay
until the terms of the incumbent directors are up to have the case dis-
missed. This is especially so when the defendants have superior access to
legal counsel and are able to mount an effective campaign of delay with
relative ease. Finally, refusing a dismissal for mootness in favor of a dec-
laration against past wrongdoing seems more in line with the underlying
purpose and remedial function of section 14(a) in its effort to insure fair
corporate sufferage and accurate preparation of proxy materials. 7
D. Suits Against Majority Shareholders
Even if the challenged transaction is itself subject to shareholder ap-
proval, the defendants may argue that the plaintiff ought not to recover
because they had such control over the corporation that the disputed
transaction would have been approved even if the proxy materials had
not been deceptive or misleading. In other words, a minority share-
holder's votes are arguably irrelevant and are not needed for a majority
shareholder to engage in fundamental corporate changes, such as merg-
ing with another corporation or dissolving a subsidiary. Thus, the proxy
solicitation is not a causal link in the process leading to the plaintiff's
harm.
The Supreme Court has never dealt with the issue of causation and
majority control because in both Borak and Mills, the plaintiffs alleged
that the defendants required the votes of minority shareholders to gain
approval for the disputed mergers and that the mergers were approved
mootness, since all of the terms of the directors elected in 1974, 1975, and 1976 have expired."
(citing Browning)); Sanders v. Thrall Car Mfg. Co., 582 F. Supp. 945, 955-56 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (good
discussion of mootness cases), aff'd, 730 F.2d 910 (3d Cir. 1984); Smillie v. Park Chem. Co., 466 F.
Supp. 572, 575 (E.D. Mich. 1979) (finding mootness for some directors because they were no longer
on the board); In Re Tenneco Sec. Litig., 449 F. Supp. 528, 531-32 (S.D. Tex. 1978) (mootness
because directors were reelected).
77. See Mills v. Elec. Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970); J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426,
431-32 (1964).
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only by small margins. In a footnote to Mills, the Supreme Court stated
that it need not decide at that time "whether causation could be shown
where the management controls a sufficient number of shares to approve
the transactions without any votes from the minority." 8 The Court re-
ferred to two conflicting lines of cases in the district courts on this issue
with no hint as to how it would decide such a case. Later the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals would argue that because the Supreme Court
cited to one line of cases as a "see" and to the other line as "but see," the
Court approved of the first line of authority.79
The major case taking a strict view of causation in this type of situa-
tion is Barnett v. Anaconda Co.8 In Barnett, the corporate defendants
allegedly used a misleading proxy statement to gain approval for the dis-
solution of a subsidiary. The court refused to find a section 14(a) viola-
tion, however, because the defendant owned 73 percent of the shares of
the subsidiary and only a two-thirds vote was required to authorize the
dissolution. Thus, the deception in the proxy materials had no causal
connection to the actual harm that the minority suffered when the sub-
sidiary was dissolved. The strict view of causation found in Barnett was
followed by a number of other courts in the late 1960s and early 1970s. 1
In most of these opinions, discussions of policy were kept to a minimum.
Stress was often placed on the fact that the corporate action would have
occurred despite the deceptive proxy statements because of the votes con-
trolled by the defendants. Arguably this strict approach to causation
forestalls pointless litigation since an order to repeat the vote with full
disclosure would merely end in the same result; damages would be point-
less unless they were considered punitive since the plaintiffs would have
been in the same situation financially even if full disclosure had been
78. Mills, 396 U.S. at 385 n.7.
79. Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 507 F.2d 374, 381-82 n.13 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
421 U.S. 976 (1975).
80. 238 F. Supp. 766 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
81. See, ag., Lewis v. Bogin, 337 F. Supp. 331 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Ross v. Longchamps, Inc., 336
F. Supp. 434 (E.D. Mo. 1971); Laufer v. Stranahan, Jr., [1969-70 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) % 92,617 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (court, while not repudiating the Barnett holding, indicated
that plaintiff might obtain other equitable relief so as to "make effective" the purpose of the proxy
rules); Weiss v. Sunasco, Inc., 295 F. Supp. 824 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Robbins v. Banner Indus., 285 F.
Supp. 758 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). Barnett has been distinguished in a number of situations. Heit v. Davis,
[1964-66 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) t 91,698 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (Court found causal-
ity when defendant controlled majority of shares at meeting but failed to control majority of out-
standing shares); Eagle v. Horvath, 241 F. Supp. 341 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (defendant did not control
preferred shares, whose vote was required; although shares could have been redeemed, they were not
redeemed and hence there was causality).
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made.8 2
Eventually, most courts abandoned the Barnett line of reasoning and
adopted a looser standard of causation.8 3 The leading case rejecting Bar-
nett at the time of the Mills decision was Laurenzano v. Einbender,84
upholding a section 14(a) action even though the defendant's majority
control made the votes of the minority shareholders on a series of finan-
cial transactions superfluous. The Laurenzano court reasoned that proxy
solicitations by majority shareholders are not "purposeless and legally
inert." Rather, "[s]uch seemingly pointless approbations have their
82. Due to section 28(a) of the Exchange Act's precluding recovery of amounts in excess of the
"actual damages on account of the act complained of," punitive damages are generally not recover-
able in private actions under the Exchange Act, although they may be recoverable under state law if
the case involves state law claims cognizable by a federal court under the doctrine of pendent juris-
diction. See, e.g., Aldrich v. Thomson McKinnon Sec. Inc., [1984-85 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 91,967 (2d Cir. 1985) (preserving right to recover punitive damages under pendent
state law claims); Hatrock v. Edward D. Jones & Co., [1984-85 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 91,920 (9th Cir. 1984) (same); Meyers v. Moody, 693 F.2d 1196 (5th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 920 (1983) (same); Jones v. Miles, 656 F.2d 103 (5th Cir. 1981). See also Flaks v.
Koegel, 504 F.2d 702 (2d Cir. 1974); DeHaas v. Empire Petroleum Co., 435 F.2d 1223 (10th Cir.
1970); Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291, 302-03 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 977 (1969);
In re Action Indus. Tender Offer, 572 F. Supp. 846 (E.D. Va. 1983); Millas v. L.F. Rothschild,
Unterberg & Towbin, [1981-82 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,441 (N.D. Cal.
1982); Ohio v. Crofters, 525 F. Supp. 1133 (S.D. Ohio 1981) (preserving right to recover punitive
damages under pendent law claims); Burkhart v. Alison Realty Trust, 363 F. Supp. 1286 (N.D. Ill.
1973); Pearlstein v. Scudder & German, [1971-72 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) t
93,439 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). The Commission may recover treble damages in appropriate insider trad-
ing situations. See Exchange Act § 21(d)(2), added by the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, 98
Stat. 1264 (1984). For discussion, see Hirsch & Lewis, Punitive Damage Awards Under the Federal
Securities Acts, 47 NOTRE DAME LAW. 72 (1971); Note, Punitive Damages Under Section 17(a) of
the Securities Act of 1933-Globus v. Law Research Serv. Inc., 11 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 1031
(1970); Note, Punitive Damages in Implied Private Actions for Fraud Under the Securities Laws, 55
CORNELL L. REV. 646 (1970); Comment, Punitive Damages for Securities Regulation, 8 Hous. L.
REV. 137 (1970); Note, The Possibility of Punitive Damages as a Remedy for a Violation of Rule l0b-
5. 68 MICH. L. REV. 1608 (1970); Note, Punitive Damages Under the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 21 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1026 (1970); Comment, The Availability of Punitive Damages for Ex-
press and Implied Causes of Action Under the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, 43 TEMP. L.Q. 140 (1970); Comment, Punitive Damages in Implied Civil Actions Under the
Federal Securities Laws: The Need for Flexibility, 17 UCLA L. REV. 1280 (1970); Comment, Puni-
tive Damages Under Section 17(a) of the 1933 Securities Act, 1970 U. ILL. L.F. 296. For discussion
of pendent jurisdiction, see infra text accompanying note 96.
83. See, e.g., Healey v. Catalyst Recovery, Inc., 616 F.2d 641 (3d Cir. 1980); Kidwell ex rel.
Penfold v. Meikle, 597 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir. 1979); Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 507 F.2d 374
(2d Cir. 1974); Jacobs v. Hanson, 464 F. Supp. 777 (D. Del. 1979); Jones v. National Distillers &
Chem. Corp., 484 F. Supp. 679 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Valente v. Pepsico, Inc., 454 F. Supp. 1228 (D.
Del. 1978).
84. 264 F. Supp. 356 (E.D.N.Y. 1966).
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uses."
85
Contrary to Barnett's strict view of causation, even if the minority
shareholders cannot defeat an oppressive majority with their votes, re-
quiring truthful proxy solicitations still has value because the "potential
victim may have recourse to measures other than the casting of prox-
ies."86 For example, a minority shareholder could bring a suit for injunc-
tive relief prior to the completion of the transaction if full disclosure is
required. 7 Full disclosure may also permit minority shareholders to
seek the full benefit of appraisal rights.8 8 Furthermore, the requirement
of full disclosure and the threat of lawsuits has a prophylactic effect. As
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals noted in Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Ce-
ment Corp.:
We cannot assume that even a rapacious controlling management would
necessarily want to hang its dirty linen out on the line and thereby expose
itself to suit or Securities Commission or other action-in terms of reputa-
tion and future take-overs.8 9
The Schlick court also noted that full disclosure in proxy materials
85. Id. at 361. See also Laurenzano v. Einbender, 448 F.2d 1, 5 (2d Cir. 1971) ("And of course,
approval was not meaningless; minority shareholder approval has value whether or not it is strictly
essential to the power to act.").
86. Heyman v. Heyman, 356 F. Supp. 958, 968 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
87. See Cole v. Schenley Indus., Inc., 563 F.2d 35, 39-40 (2d Cir. 1977); Schlick v. Penn-Dixie
Cement Corp., 507 F.2d 374, 382 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 976 (1975); Evmar Oil Corp.
v. Getty Oil Co., [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,358 (C.D. Cal. 1978);
Clayton v. Skelly Oil Co., [1977-78 Transfer Binder FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,269 (S.D.N.Y.
1977); Tanzer v. Haynie, 405 F. Supp. 650 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). Some courts have required that a
plaintiff establish that he would have had a reasonable probability of obtaining relief at the state
level. See, eg., Kidwell ex rel Penfold v. Meikle, 597 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir. 1979). Other courts,
however, merely require a showing that a state court would have "entertained" an action for appro-
priate relief. See, eg., Alabama Farm Bureau Mutual Casualty Co. v. American Fidelity Life Ins.
Co., 606 F.2d 602 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 820 (1980). For discussion of rule lOb-5
cases taking this approach, see Note, Suits for Breach of Fiduciary Duty Under Rule J0b-5 After
Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1874 (1978) (arguing that plaintiff need only
show that state courts would have entertained action and not that it would have been successful);
Note, The Pendulum Swings Farther: The "In Connection With" Requirement and Pretrial Dismis-
sals of Rule l0b-5 Private Claims for Damages, 56 TEX. L. REV. 62 (1977); Recent Decisions-Securi-
ties Law, 46 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 861 (1978); Note, Goldberg v. Meridor: The Second Circuit's
Resurrection of Rule 10b-5 Liability for Breaches of Corporate Fiduciary Duties to Minority Share-
holders, 64 VA. L. REV. 765 (1978); Rule 10b-5 Developments, 38 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 893 (1980).
88. See Selk v. St. Paul Ammonia Products Inc., 597 F.2d 635, 638 (8th Cir. 1979). See also
Swanson v. American Consumer Indus., Inc., 415 F.2d 1326, 1332-33 (7th Cir. 1969) (rule 10b-5
case).
89. Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 507 F.2d 374, 384 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421
U.S. 976 (1975).
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serves to inform the market "so as to permit well-based decisions about
buying, selling and holding the securities involved in the transaction."90
This broader view of causation finds support in the spirit and intent of
section 14(a), the purpose of which is to compel full and fair disclosure
and to promote fair corporate suffrage.91 Congress was particularly con-
cerned about protecting minority shareholders from the schemes of man-
agement.92 Pursuant to this broad remedial purpose, the Mills Court
identified the relevant causal test to be one of materiality when the proxy
solicitation "was an essential link in the accomplishment of the transac-
tion."93 If a corporation is required by law to solicit proxies to approve
certain transactions, the proxy solicitation is an essential link and meets
the causal test set out in Mills94 even if management has "the naked
strength to consummate a fraudulent transaction."9 " The proxy solicita-
tion is essential because it is required by law before managers can engage
in fundamental corporate changes. Corporate managers with majority
control should not be allowed to engage in misleading proxy solicitations,
regardless of their voting strength.
E. Pendent Jurisdiction Over State Claims
Although the section 14(a) cases have not discussed the possibility in
much detail, one might assume that if a plaintiff alleges a section 14(a)
violation and seeks equitable relief against past elections, then the court
would also have pendent jurisdiction to hear the state damage claims.
The system of federalism normally precludes federal courts from hear-
ing cases based on state law, unless the requirements of diversity jurisdic-
tion are met. However, if a federal court has a case or controversy
properly before it that contains both federal and state claims, it may exer-
cise pendent jurisdiction over the state claims and decide the case as a
90. Id.
91. See Selk v. St. Paul Ammonia Products Inc., 597 F.2d 635, 638 (8th Cir. 1979).
92. See generally J.1. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 431 (1964).
93. Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970).
94. See Smillie v. Park Chem. Co., 466 F. Supp. 572, 577-78 (E.D. Mich. 1979) ("[I]f the
regulations required that these omissions be included in every proxy statement, then they are mate-
rial as a matter of law. If the proxy votes were necessary to carry the resolutions being considered
and to elect directors, then causation is established. Although they may have held sufficient shares
to approve all matters under consideration, defendants do not deny that management found the
proxy solicitations to be essential. It would appear to us that causation is established as a matter of
law").
95. Heyman v. Heyman, 356 F. Supp. 958, 967 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
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whole. In order to determine if a federal court has the power to decide
state claims, the court must decide that:
... [t]he state and federal claims ... derive from a common nucleus of
operative fact. But if, considered without regard to their federal or state
character, a plaintiff's claims are such that he would ordinarily be expected
to try them all in one judicial proceeding, then, assuming substantiality of
the federal issues there is power in federal courts to hear the whole.96
But even if a federal court has the power to decide state claims, it may
exercise its discretion and not assume pendent jurisdiction for a number
of reasons. The key factors include considerations of judicial economy,
convenience and fairness to the litigants, and whether the state law is
clear and settled on the matter:
Certainly, if the federal claims are dismissed before trial, even though not
insubstantial in a jurisdictional sense, the state claims should be dismissed
as well. Similarly, if it appears that the state issues substantially
predominate, whether in terms of proof, of the scope of the issues raised, or
of the comprehensiveness of the remedy sought, the state claims may be
dismissed without prejudice and left for resolution to state tribunals.97
In the section 14(a) context, if a plaintiff can obtain equitable rescis-
sion of past elections, it would appear that in most cases a federal court
has thepower to hear pendent state claims as well. For example, a failure
to disclose past self-dealing would appear to be derived from a "common
nucleus of operative fact" with the continuation of self-dealing after the
elections. Similarly, if a court could set aside an election for failure of the
defendant directors to disclose past bribes and kickbacks, it would have
the power to hear state law claims relating to waste of corpbrate assets in
the post-election period since the subject of both the state and federal
claims is the wrongful conduct of the directors over a period of time.
The question of discretion to exercise pendent jurisdiction over the
state claims is more difficult. If it appears that the section 14(a) claim for
rescission of elections and the holding of new elections is substantial and
not frivolous, a federal court may wish to consider the state claims. This
certainly makes sense in terms of judicial economy and fairness to the
litigants even when the court ultimately dismisses the federal claims
before the final resolution of the case.98
96. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966).
97. Id. at 726, 727.
98. See Klaus v. Hi-Shear Corp., 528 F.2d 225, 231 (9th Cir. 1975) ("The court therefore also
had pendent jurisdiction over the state claims. The federal issues presented were substantial and not
frivolous; the district court will retain power to adjudicate the state claims even if it should ulti-
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However, if a court believes that an equitable claim against elections is
being invoked solely to get the state claims into federal court, it may use
its discretion to dismiss the state claims. Dismissal of state claims is also
appropriate if the state laws regarding the underlying corporate wrong
are unclear or unsettled, or if proof of the state claim will occupy much
of the case.9 9 It seems likely that in most cases plaintiffs will be more
interested in obtaining damages than in seeking to rescind a past election.
More often than not, the underlying corporate transaction that a plaintiff
wishes to attack-i.e., the bribes, self-dealing, etc.-will involve more
complex proof than the material nondisclosures or misstatements in the
proxy solicitation materials. Therefore, in many cases, a court may wish
to dismiss the state claims.
III. MATERIALITY
A. The Fundamental Standard
The Supreme Court announced the basic test of materiality in TSC
Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc. o In this case, National Industries
("National") acquired 34 percent of TSC Industries ("TSC's") voting
shares. National placed five of its nominees on TSC's board. Thereafter,
the TSC board approved a proposal to liquidate and sell all its assets to
National, with the TSC shareholders receiving shares of National in ex-
change for their TSC shares. TSC and National issued a joint proxy
statement recommending shareholder approval of the proposal, and the
proposal was thereafter adopted. 10
Northway, Inc. ("Northway") was a shareholder in TSC. Northway
brought suit against National and TSC under rule 14a-9 alleging that the
joint proxy statement omitted material facts. More specifically,
Northway argued that the proxy statement did not adequately disclose
National's control over TSC by its failure to mention that the current
chairman of the TSC board was also the president of National. In addi-
mately dismiss all the federal claims."). See also Galef v. Alexander, 615 F.2d 51, 66 n.23 (2d Cir.
1980) ("We recognize the possibility that stockholders may assert § 14(a) claims for the sole purpose
of invoking federal jurisdiction. But this risk should be lessened by FED. R. Civ. P. 11 ... which
provides for discipline if an attorney files a pleading if'to the best of his knowledge, information, and
belief' there is not 'good ground to support' the pleading.").
99. See In re Coin Oil/Tesoro Petroleum Corp. Sec. Litig., 467 F. Supp. 227, 248 (W.D. Tex.
1979).
100 426 U.S. 438 (1976).
101. Id. at 440-41.
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tion, Northway claimed that the proxy statement did not state that, in
reports filed with the SEC, TSC and National had stated that National
was the parent of TSC. Northway also argued that the defendants
should have disclosed unfavorable statements made by an investment
banking firm that had earlier approved of the transaction, as well as the
fact that in the two years prior to the merger, National had been buying
up its own shares, thereby manipulating the market price. 10 2
The district court denied Northway's motion for summary judgment.
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the lower
court's decision.103 The focus of the court's reversal was its definition of
materiality. An omitted fact is material, the court held, if it "might have
been considered important by a reasonable shareholder who was in the
process of deciding how to vote."" °  The court characterized this as a
fairly lenient standard that satisfied the broad prophylactic purposes of
section 14(a) and furthered a policy of full disclosure. 10 5 It stated that
any stricter test would require the plaintiff to introduce evidence at trial
showing that "the challenged omission had an actual impact on his
case," and that such proof of an actual impact would be inconsistent with
the Supreme Court's holdings in Mills and Affiliated Ute that independ-
ent proof of causation or actual reliance is unnecessary.' 6 Given this
view of materiality, the court held that the omissions were material as a
matter of law.
In doing so, the court rejected a more stringent test adopted by the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc.'07
The Gerstle court, following the Restatement of Torts, 08 held that the
102. Id. at 451-64.
103. Northway, Inc. v. TSC Indus. Inc., 512 F.2d 324 (7th Cir. 1975), rev"d, 426 U.S. 438
(1976).
104. Id. at 330.
105. Id. at 330-31 n.12.
106. Id. at 331 n.13. See Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 384 (1970):
Where the misstatement or omission in a proxy statement has been shown to be "mate-
rial,".. . that determination itself indubitably embodies a conclusion that the defect was of
such a character that it might have been considered important by a reasonable shareholder
who was in the process of deciding how to vote.
Similarly, in Affiliated Ute Citizen v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 154 (1972), the Court stated:
[P]ositive proof of reliance is not a prerequisite to recovery. All that is necessary is that the
facts withheld be material in the sense that a reasonable investor might have considered
them important in the making of this decision.
107. 478 F.2d 1281, 1301-02 (2d Cir. 1973). The Gerstle test has also been followed by the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals. See Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579, 603-04 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 873 (1974).
108. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 538(2)(a) (1938).
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basic test of materiality is whether "a reasonable man would attach im-
portance [to the fact misrepresented] in determining his choice of action
in the transaction in question"" or whether there was a "substantial
likelihood" that the misstatement or omission may have led a share-
holder to grant a proxy different than he would have otherwise done.
The Gerstle court stated that it did not believe that the Supreme Court's
statements in Mills or Affiliated Ute were "in fact intended to establish a
definition of materiality." ' While Judge Friendly (the author of the
Gerstle opinion) recognized that "the difference between 'might' and
'would' may seem gossamer, the former is too suggestive of mere possi-
bility, however unlikely. When account is taken of the heavy damages
that may be imposed, a standard tending toward probability rather than
toward mere possibility is more appropriate."11'
On appeal of TSC Industries, the Supreme Court followed Judge
Friendly's view of materiality and rejected that of the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals, observing that its statements in Mills and Affiliated
Ute were not meant to be precise statements of the law, and that it never
meant "to foreclose further inquiry into the meaning of materiality under
Rule 14a-9." '112
The Supreme Court defined materiality as follows:
An omitted fact is material if there is a substantial likelihood that a reason-
able shareholder would consider it important in deciding how to vote....
[This standard] does not require proof of a substantial likelihood that dis-
closure of the omitted fact would have caused the reasonable investor to
change his vote. What the standard does contemplate is a showing of a
substantial likelihood that, under all the circumstances, the omitted fact
would have assumed actual significance in the deliberations of the reason-
able shareholder. Put another way, there must be a substantial likelihood
that the disclosure of the omitted fact would have significantly altered the
"total mix" of information made available.1 13
The Court thought this test to be a reasonable balance between the
broad remedial purposes of section 14(a) and the dangers of requiring too
much disclosure, expressing its concern that the Seventh Circuit Court of
109. Gerstle, 478 F.2d at 1302 (emphasis in original).
110. Id. at 1301.
111. Id. at 1302.
112. TSC Indus. Inc., v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 447 (1976).
113. Id. at 449. To the extent that the Supreme Court's standard precludes a showing that an
omitted fact would have caused a shareholder to switch a vote had it been included, it differs from
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals' standard. See supra text accompanying notes 109-110.
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Appeals' less stringent test would lead to corporate liability "for insignifi-
cant omissions or misstatements." Also, "management's fear of exposing
itself to substantial liability may cause it simply to bury the shareholders
in an avalanche of trivial information." '114 The Court went on to hold
that the issue of materiality involved "delicate assessments of the infer-
ences a 'reasonable shareholder' would draw from a given set of facts,"
and that such a determination was particularly suited for the trier of
fact." 5 Only in cases where established omissions are "so obviously im-
portant to an investor, that reasonable minds cannot differ" can the issue
of materiality be resolved as a matter of law by summary judgment.116
The Supreme Court's definition of materiality in TSC has since been
repeated, almost mechanically, in numerous cases arising under section
14(a), section 14(e) and rule lOb-5.1 17 Application of the section 14(a)
standard to other areas is appropriate because "Section 10(b) and Rule
lOb-5 and Section 14(a) and (e) and Rule 14a-9 are obviously aimed at
the same general evils in the field of corporate ownership, management
and finance, are in pari materia and should be similarly construed." '
Although the TSC definition of materiality is the accepted one, there
have been a few attempts at slight modifications. For example, in Pav-
lidis v.. New England Patriots Football Club, Inc.,9 the plaintiffs argued
that the TSC standard should be relaxed (from a plaintiff's view) in cases
involving insiders or uncontested mergers "where the management of the
target company is identical with the management of the offeror."' 2 This
less stringent standard of materiality ("less" in the sense that more infor-
mation is considered to be material) is needed when management's inter-
114. Id. at 448.
115. Id. at 450.
116. Id., quoting Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Hutton, 422 F.2d 1124, 1129 (4th Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 416 U.S. 916 (1974).
117. See, e.g., Flynn v. Bass Bros. Enters., Inc., 744 F.2d 978, 985 (3d Cir. 1984) (§ 14(e)-"We
see no reason not to utilize the [TSC] formulation for evaluating materiality in the context of a
tender offer."); Staffin v. Greenberg, 672 F.2d 1196, 1205 (3d Cir. 1982) (§ 14(e)); Panter v. Marshall
Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 289 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1062 (1981) (rule lOb-5); Healey v.
Catalyst Recovery of Pennsylvania Inc., 616 F.2d 641, 647 (3d Cir. 1980) (rule 10b-5); James v.
Gerber Products Co., 587 F.2d 324, 327 (6th Cir. 1978) (rule lOb-5); Augenstein v. McCormick &
Co., 581 F. Supp. 452, 459 (D. Md. 1984) (rule lOb-5); Resource Exploration v. Yankee Oil & Gas,
Inc., 566 F. Supp. 54, 62 (N.D. Ohio 1983) (§ 14(e)); Radol v. Thomas, 556 F. Supp. 586, 593 n.15
(S.D. Ohio 1983) (rule lOb-5 and § 14(e)); Beebe v. Pacific Realty Trust, 99 F.R.D. 60 (D. Ore.
1983) (rule 14a-9).
118. Golub v. PPD Corp., 576 F.2d 759, 764 (8th Cir. 1978).
119. 737 F.2d 1227 (1st Cir. 1984).
120. Id. at 1231.
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ests differ from those of the shareholders, and management may have
access to information which is not available to the shareholders, so as to
insure that the public has market risks identical with those of insiders.121
Although the Pavlidis court rejected a lower standard of materiality in
such cases as being inconsistent with TSC,122 it recognized that what
would not be material in the context of an adversarial transaction may be
material in a one-sided transaction. In other words, "although the same
standard of materiality would apply to both kinds of transactions, the
standard might identify different facts as material in each transac-
tion." '23 Thus, when management's interest conflict with those of the
shareholders, a court may be more skeptical of management's disclosure
than normal:
[A]lthough § 14(a) requires any party soliciting proxies, regardless of his
status or interest in the transaction, to disclose all material information, a
self-dealing insider may have a "heavier burden of disclosure" in the sense
that he will find it more difficult to convince the court that he has met the
requirements of § 14(a). 124
Alternatively, some courts have tightened the TSC standard, making it
more difficult for plaintiffs to prevail on the materiality issue. For exam-
ple, in Radol v. Thomas,t25 a rule lOb-5 and section 14(e) case, the dis-
trict court held that, in addition to the standard of materiality set out in
TSC Industries, there was "an additional requirement" before a plaintiff
could show omitted information was material. "That requirement is that
the facts or conclusions contained in information claimed to be 'material'
can be determined with 'substantial certainty.' "26 The purpose of the
"substantial certainty" requirement is to avoid forcing management to
disclose information which may appear quite significant but which "if
disclosed, would risk misleading the shareholder because the bases for
these conclusions are speculative and unreliable." 127 Although this "sub-
121. See Cook v. Avien, Inc., 573 F.2d 685, 694 n.19 (1st Cir. 1978) (rule lOb-5-"The securities
acts place a special burden on insiders."); Blanchette v. Providence & Worcester Co., 428 F. Supp.
347, 353 (D. Del. 1977) (§ 14(e) case relying on TSC).
122. Pavlidis v. New England Patriots Football Club Inc., 737 F.2d 1227, 1231 (lst Cir. 1984)
("The fact that a proxy statement is drafted by insiders acting in their own interest does not change
the standard of materiality. A fact does not become more material to the shareholder's decision
because it is withheld by an insider, or because the insider might profit by withholding it").
123, Id.
124. Id.
125. 534 F. Supp. 1302 (S.D. Ohio 1982).
126. Id. at 1308 (citing cases).
127. Id. at 1307.
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stantial certainty" requirement is characterized by the court as an "addi-
tional requirement," it might be better characterized as merely a
modification of the basic TSC standard. Whatever uncertainty might ex-
ist about various pieces of information, the standard of materiality itself
might be the same in all contexts. 128 Thus it might be analytically better
to consider certain types of information as not being "material" as a mat-
ter of law if they cannot be determined with "substantial certainty." In
other words, a reasonable shareholder, when deciding how to vote,
would not take into account information based on mere speculation or
unsubstantiated hunches.
In some cases the question of "substantial certainty" may become par-
ticularly relevant. Such cases involve management's subjective motiva-
tions for a certain proposal; various types of "soft" information, such as
projections of profits or asset valuations; alternative possible transac-
tions; and management's opinion as to a proposal's fairness or unfairness.
In these situations, there is a tension between requiring the disclosure of
all sorts of information which a shareholder would consider significant
and restricting disclosure to definite facts rather than subjective opinions
or speculations.
. Subjective Motivation
The question of whether subjective motivation need be disclosed often
arises in two contexts, in both of which the interests of management di-
verge from those of the shareholders. The first of these involves "going
private" situations where shareholders are asked to approve a transaction
in which a new privately held corporation purchases all the shares or
assets of the old corporation. Usually, the "going private" transaction is
in the interests of management, which stays on to run the new corpora-
tion and may receive extra compensation for doing so. Minority share-
holders opposed to the transaction argue that management should
disclose in the proxy statement its true reasons for supporting the pro-
posed transaction, which may be personal financial gain. The second
area involving subjective motivation is when management proposes anti-
takeover amendments to the by-laws or the articles of incorporation.
Shareholders have argued that management should disclose that its per-
sonal motivation for supporting these propositions is its wish to protect
itself against replacement by a new management.
128. See Pavlidis, 737 F.2d 1227 and supra text accompanying note 122.
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In both these situations-going private transactions and anti-takeover
proposals-most courts have held that subjective motivation need not be
disclosed, agreeing with the district court in Stedman v. Storer which
stated: "The unclean heart of a director is not actionable, whether or not
it is 'disclosed,' unless the impurities are translated into actionable deeds
or omissions both objective and external." 129 If the underlying facts are
fairly stated, subjective motivations need not be disclosed.130
This is not to say that management never has the duty to disclose sub-
jective motivations; if such a duty exists, it exists under state law-not
under federal securities law. As the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
pointed out in Golub v. PPD Corp., 131 the same considerations that led
the Supreme Court in Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green 132 to hold that
rule lOb-5 did not protect shareholders from breach of the fiduciary duty
by majority shareholders are applicable in the section 14(a) area. Anti-
takeover proposals or going private transactions which harm sharehold-
ers and work to the advantage of majority shareholders or management,
may create causes of action under state law, but "it was not the purpose
129. 308 F. Supp. 881, 887 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). See also Amalgamated Clothing & Textile Workers
Union v. J.P. Stevens & Co., 475 F. Supp. 328 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), vacated as moot, 638 F.2d 7 (2d Cir.
1980) (management need not be required to accuse itself of anti-social tendencies, such as to thwart a
union).
130 See Rodman v. Grant Found., 608 F.2d 64, 70-72 (2d Cir. 1979) (in absence of some "ulte-
nor wrongful design," directors were not required to describe the effect stock purchases and em-
ployee stock purchase program had on the entrenchment of management); Golub v. PPD Corp., 576
F.2d 759, 764-65 (8th Cir. 1978) (true motivation of those selling assets of company to new company
when management would receive bonuses for staying on need not be disclosed in proxy materials);
Steinberg v. Pargas, Inc., FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 91,979 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (proxy materials need
not disclose subjective motives of corporate officers and directors in rejecting takeover proposal from
one bidder and accepting that of another since plaintiff's allegations amounted to nothing more than
breach of fiduciary duty, actionable under state law); Dixon v. Ladish Co., 597 F. Supp. 20 (E.D.
Wis. 1984) (management need not disclose tax motivation nor desire for corporate control); District
65, UAW v. Harper & Row, 11983-84 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 99,608
(S.D.N.Y. 1983) (management need not disclose motivation); Koppel v. Wien, 575 F. Supp. 960,
967-68 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), modified, 743 F.2d 129 (2d Cir. 1984) (management need not disclose self-
interest involved in proposal to sell off joint venture assets); Morrissey v. County Tower Corp., 559
F. Supp. 1115, 1121-23 (E.D. Mo.), aff'd, 717 F.2d 1227 (8th Cir. 1983) (directors need not disclose
subjective motives behind anti-takeover proposals); Bank & Trust Co. of Old York Road v. Hankin,
552 F. Supp. 1330 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (management need not disclose motives, particularly when mo-
tives are obvious); Issen v. GSC Enterprises, Inc., 508 F. Supp. 1278 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (same); Ruben-
stein v. I.U. Int'l Corp., 506 F. Supp. 311 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (same, but if disclosure of motive is made,
disclosure must be accurate); Lewis v. Oppenheimer Co., 481 F. Supp. 1199, 1204 (S.D.N.Y. 1979)
(sale of company's assets and directors' interests in new company).
131. 576 F.2d at 764.
132. 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
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of the federal security laws to provide a federal cause of action for stock-
holders who have been damaged by mere corporate mismanagement or
breach of fiduciary duty."133
On the other hand, it is arguable that a requirement that subjective
motivation be disclosed may enable shareholders to seek injunctive or
other relief under state law. An example of this view is found in SEC v.
Parklane Hosiery,"' in which the Commission sought to enjoin a "going
private" transaction because the proxy statement failed to inform share-
holders that the purpose of the transaction was to allow the president
and principal shareholder to discharge his personal debts from the com-
pany's treasury. Although the defendant argued that the purpose of the
transaction was not material and relied on Santa Fe Industries, the Sec-
ond Circuit Court of Appeals held the purpose to be a material fact,
stating that if the purpose of the transaction had been announced, the
shareholder might have been able to enjoin it under state law since it
involved a merger which lacked a valid corporate purpose. 135 Thus,
when the nondisclosed purpose could have supported a suit by minority
shareholders based on state law, the subjective motivation becomes mate-
rial. The same argument would apply in the context of an anti-takeover
proposal; if the proposal has an illicit purpose, disclosure may be re-
quired under the proxy rules. 13
6
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals and the District Court for the
Southern District of New York subsequently tried to restrict Parklane
Hosiery by stressing the fact that the defendant, apart from failing to
disclose the subjective motivation for the "going private" transaction,
had not disclosed his substantial personal debts.1 37 However, a fair read-
133. Golub v. PPD Corp., 576 F.2d at 764. See also Lewis v. Oppenheimer Co., 481 F. Supp. at
1204.
134. 558 F.2d 1083 (2d Cir. 1977). See also Parklane Hosiery Co., Inc. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322
(1979) (corporate defendant collaterally estopped from relitigating proxy violation issue in private
cause of action after SEC action).
135. Parklane Hosiery, 558 F.2d at 1088. For discussion of similar point with respect to the
question of causation, see supra text accompanying note 87.
136. See Texas Partners v. Conrock Co., 685 F.2d 1116, 1120 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460
U.S. 1029 (1983) (triable issue as to whether failure of proxy materials to disclose true motives
behind anti-takeover proposal was material to shareholders).
137. Rodman v. Grant Found., 608 F.2d 64, 71 n.5 (2d Cir. 1979) ("SEC v. Parklane Hosiery
Co.... relied upon by appellant, is not to the contrary. There, the 'overriding purpose' for a going-
private scheme was to enable the president and principal shareholder of the company to discharge
his personal debts from the company treasury, and there was 'not so much as a hint' of these debts in
the proxy statement."); Lewis v. Oppenheimer Co., 481 F. Supp. at 1206.
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ing of Parklane Hosiery reveals that the court did not emphasize the non-
disclosure of the personal debts; rather the broad language of the opinion
stresses the requirement that, in general, subjective motivation in going
private transactions be disclosed if it is relevant to a shareholder's seek-
ing appropriate relief under state law. 138
While most cases do not require disclosure of subjective motivation,
the reasoning behind Parklane Hosiery is more convincing. Certainly, if
a reasonable shareholder would consider a director's subjective motiva-
tion to be important when deciding how to vote, and can use that infor-
mation to enjoin a particular transaction in a state court, then that
information is material and should be included in a proxy statement.
Although there may be some problems in determining management's
precise subjective motivation behind a particular transaction, such a task
appears to be no more difficult in the proxy area than it is in other areas
of the law in which subjective motivation is important. When the subjec-
tive motivation is too ephemeral or too vague and not easily determina-
ble, then the "substantial certainty" test of Radol v. Thomas 39 would
preclude a finding of materiality.
C. Soft Information
Apart from the subjective motivation for proposing a particular trans-
action, management may have made predictions as to the profitability of
transactions it presents for shareholder approval. Appraisals of assets
138. See Parklane Hosiery, 558 F.2d at 1088. The court distinguished Santa Fe Indus. by argu-
ing that in that case the short-form merger could be accomplished without the consent of the minor-
ity shareholders and that it was admitted by the plaintiffs that there had been full and fair disclosure.
Contrary to the situation under the Delaware short-form merger statute, had the share-
holders of Parklane been aware of Somekh's reasons for the going-private transaction, they,
or others, might well have been able to enjoin the merger under New York law.... This
case involved a failure to disclose when the non-disclosed information could have been
used by the minority shareholders to attempt to enjoin the merger. The purpose for the
merger was, therefore, relevant. (Id. emphasis added).
One might attempt to distinguish Parklane Hosiery on the ground that it involved a Commission
enforcement action and therefore a lower standard of materiality should apply. However, there
seems to be little support for such a position in the Supreme Court's formulation of the materiality
standard in TSC Industries. Whether or not the Commission is involved, the standard of materiality
should be the same-what a reasonable shareholder would consider important. Furthermore, in
Parklane Hosiery, the Court held that the corporate defendant was collaterally estopped from reliti-
gating factual issues regarding materiality, once a Commission action had decided these issues.
Thus, the standard of materiality must be the same in both a private and a Commission action. But
see id. at 325 n.2 (observing that in private action a plaintiffhas the additional burden of proving that
he was injured and suffered damages).
139. See supra text accompanying notes 125-27.
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owned by the company may have been prepared for management's inter-
nal use. In both instances such information is clearly material within the
parameters of the standard already discussed. Nonetheless, both the Se-
curities and Exchange Commission and the courts have until recently not
required its disclosure and, in fact, have had a policy prohibiting
disclosure.
The Commission had a long-standing policy against the inclusion of
soft information in proxy materials. Prior to 1976, the examples of mis-
leading statements following rule 14a-9 included "[p]redictions as to spe-
cific future market values, earnings or dividends."'' 4  Even though asset
valuations or appraisals were not specifically mentioned, "[ilt has long
been an article of faith among lawyers specializing in the securities field
that appraisals of assets could not be included in a proxy statement.' 4'a
Commission policy was considered to be the same toward asset apprais-
als as toward predictions of future earnings. 42 The policy stemmed from
a distrust of the reliability of projections and appraisals, fears that inves-
tors and shareholders would place more weight on the soft information
than was warranted, and the impracticability of the Commission's lim-
ited staff confirming the accuracy of soft information on a case-by-case
basis. In addition, there was a fear of imposing enormous liabilities on
corporations either for not disclosing what the defendants thought was
reliable information or for disclosing information that ultimately was
found to be unreliable."43 Thus, even if under the normal standard soft
information would be material, the entire category was, for policy rea-
sons, excluded from proxy statements.
During the more recent past, however, the Commission began to
change its policy. The former policy led to situations in which crucial
information about particular transactions was reserved for insiders and
withheld from the investing public.' 4 The older policy thus seemed out
140. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1974).
141. Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281, 1293 (2d Cir. 1973).
142. According to one authority, the SEC's examiners were "trained to strike appraisal values as
unacceptable whenever they read them in documents filed with the Commission." T. FIFLIS & H.
KRIPKE, ACCOUNTING FOR LAWYERS 472 (1971), quoted in Gerstle, 478 F.2d at 1291. See also
Kohn v. American Metal Climax, Inc., 458 F.2d 255, 265 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 874
(1972).
143. Gerstle, 478 F.2d at 1294; Flynn v. Bass Bros. Enterprises Inc., 744 F.2d 978, 985-86 (3d
Cir. 1984).
144. "For too long, discussions by corporations with outsiders on future economic performance
have gone on behind a cloak of informal practice and procedure and this has led to uneven and
unfair dissemination of forecast information." Statement by the Commission on Disclosure of Pro.
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of date, particularly so in view of the increasing use of proxy contests and
tender offers.1 4
5
In 1973, the Commission announced its intention to issue new compre-
hensive rules regarding soft information. The basic policy would not re-
quire forecasts, but if forecasts were made, they should be treated like
any other material event, such as a declaration of dividends, a merger or
major management changes, and thus filed with the Commission and
made publicly available.146
The Commission's announcement accompanied the controversy aris-
ing from its brief in a private section 14(a) action, Gerstle v. Gamble-
Skogmo, Inc. 147 In Gerstle, the plaintiffs argued that the defendants vio-
lated section 14(a) by failing to include, in proxies seeking approval of a
merger, the defendant's appraisals of the market value of the company's
assets. Even though the Commission staff had in 1963 specifically ex-
cluded asset appraisals from the proxy materials for this very transaction,
the Commission, in its brief amicus, in effect reversed the staff position
and argued that in certain circumstances disclosure of asset appraisals is
necessary to make the proxy statement not misleading. 148 Even though
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals refused to penalize the defendant in
Gerstle for the Commission's quite informal change of position, the Com-
mission's change of policy appeared to be a landmark.
Although the securities community expected the Commission to issue
a comprehensive soft information policy after 1973, such a policy was
never issued. Instead, the Commission has made a series of gradual
changes. For example, in 1976, the Commission deleted the reference to
future earnings as a type of misleading statement under rule 14a-9, 14 9
and stated that it wished neither to encourage nor discourage the making
of earnings projections but that it would permit corporations to release
projections that were made in good faith and that had a reasonable ba-
jections of Future Economic Performance, Sec. Act Rel. No. 5302, See. Exch. Act Rel. No. 9984,
[1972-73 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 79,211 (Feb. 2, 1973).
145. Flynn v. Bass Bros. Enterprises, Inc., 744 F.2d 978, 987 (3d Cir. 1984) ("The present spate
of proxy contests and tender offers was not anticipated when the SEC initially formulated its policy
of nondisclosure of soft information.").
146. See supra note 144.
147. See supra note 141.
148. Gerstle, 478 F.2d at 1291-92.
149. 41 Fed. Reg. 19932 (May 14, 1976).
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sis.150 In 1979, the Commission adopted a "safe harbor" rule for "for-
warding-looking" statements containing projections of earnings and
losses, dividends, capital structure, or future management objectives.' 5 '
If such projections are disclosed in good faith and with a reasonable ba-
sis, then they will not be considered fraudulent, subjecting management
to liability solely because the projected results do not materialize. In
1980, the Commission authorized disclosure of appraisals in proxy state-
ments when the principal issue in a proxy contest is the liquidation of all
or part of the assets of an issuer.'52 Such asset valuations, however, must
have a reasonable basis and be made in good faith, and the information
must be presented in a way so as to not distort the original context.
Given these changes in Commission policy, there are still some uncer-
tainties as to corporate liability for failing to disclose soft information in
particular situations. Much of the problem in recent decisions has been
that the disputed proxy statements were issued when the Commission's
policy was hostile to soft information disclosure even though the case
was finally resolved when the Commission's policy had changed. In such
situations, most courts have been reluctant to impose liability on defend-
ants for not disclosing information'53 and have followed the reasoning of
the Commission's former policy that soft information need not be dis-
closed because it is unreliable and potentially misleading. t 54
150. Sec. Act. Re]. No. 5699, See. Exch. Act Rel. No. 12371, [1975-76 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 80,461 (Apr. 23, 1976).
151. 44 Fed. Reg. 38810 (July 2, 1979), codified, 17 C.F.R. § 230.175 (1984).
152. Interpretative Release Relating to Proxy Rules, Sec. Exch. Act Rel. No. 34-16833 (May 23,
1980) codified, 17 C.F.R. 241.16833 (1984).
153. See South Coast Services Corp. v. Santa Ana Valley, 669 F.2d 1265, 1271 n.3 (9th Cir.
1982) (later SEC releases "are not binding on our decision, as the proxy materials in this case pre-
date their formulation"); Gerstle, 478 F.2d at 1294 ("But we would be loath to impose a huge liabil-
ity on Skogmo on the basis of what we regard as a substantial modification, if not reversal of the
SEC's position on disclosure of appraisals in proxy statements, by way of its amicus brief in this
case."); Lewis v. Oppenheimer Co., 481 F. Supp. 1199, 1208 n.6 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (deletion of future
earnings from note to rule 14a-9 and safe harbor rules held to have no effect since proxy statements
which failed to disclose prediction of future earnings predated Commission changes). But see Flynn
v. Bass Brothers Enterprises, Inc., 744 F.2d 978, 988 (3d Cir. 1984) (court, without altering the
outcome of the litigation before it, stated prospectively that "[i]n order to give full effect to the
evolution of the law of disclosure, and to avoid in the future, at least in the Third Circuit, the
problem caused by the time lag.., today we set forth the law for disclosure of soft information as it
is to be applied from this date on").
154. See Pavlidis v. New England Patriot's Football Club, Inc., 737 F.2d at 1227, 1233 (1st Cir.
1984) ("The federal securities laws do not require corporate managers to include speculations about
future profitability in proxy statements."); South Coast Services Corp., 669 F.2d at 1270-72 (no rule
14a-9 violation for failure to disclose board of directors' estimates of fair market value of assets in
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol64/iss2/4
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A few courts have departed from the norm and have considered the
change in Commission policy as imposing a duty to disclose soft informa-
tion under certain circumstances, recognizing the materiality of soft in-
formation under the TSC standard. However, no court has ruled that
soft information must always be disclosed and the approach has been on
a case-by-case basis.
A good example of this approach is Flynn v. Bass Brothers Enterprises,
Inc., a section 14(e) case based on section 14(a) reasoning and prece-
dent. In Flynn, former minority shareholders of a target company ar-
gued that the tender offeror and the management of the target company
violated section 14(e) by failing to disclose internal asset valuations of the
target. After surveying the changing Commission policy, the court es-
tablished the proper standard for determining the materiality of soft in-
formation in the future, presumably under both section 14(e) and section
14(a):
Henceforth, the law is not that asset appraisals are, as a matter of law,
immaterial. Rather, in appropriate cases, such information must be dis-
closed. Courts should ascertain the duty to disclose asset valuations and
other soft information on a case by case basis, by weighing the potential aid
such information will give a shareholder against the potential harm, such as
undue reliance, if the information is released with a proper cautionary note.
The factors a court must consider in making such a determination are:
the facts upon which the information is based; the qualifications of those
who prepared or compiled it; the purpose for which the information was
originally intended; its relevance to the stockholders' impending decision;
the degree of subjectivity or bias reflected in its preparation; the degree to
which the information is unique; and the availability to the investor of other
view of traditional Commission policy against such disclosure and also since valuations were not
based on objective, reasonably certain data); Deutsch v. Flannery, 597 F. Supp. 917 (S.D.N.Y. 1984)
(no need to disclose predictions of future value); Caspary v. Louisiana Land & Exploration Co., 579
F. Supp. 1105 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (no obligation to disclose internal projections), aff'dper curiam, 725
F.2d 189 (2d Cir. 1984); Shamrock Assocs. v. Moraga Corp., 557 F. Supp. 198, 205 (D. Del. 1983)
("To require a corporation to disclose the speculative profitability of future corporate transactions
does not fall within the duty of disclosure imposed by lOb-5 or rule 14a-9."). Cf Starkman v.
Marathon Oil Co., [Current Volume] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 92,290 (6th Cir. 1985) (similar
result for asset appraisals and earnings and cash flow projections in tender offer materials). On the
other hand, if projections are made, liability may be imposed if they are made recklessly, and under
some circumstances there may be a duty of affirmative investigation to ascertain whether the projec-
tions have a reasonable basis. Eisenberg v. Gagnon, 766 F.2d 770 (3d Cir.), cert. denied sub. noma.
Wasserstrom v. Eisenberg, 106 S. Ct. 342 (1985). Nonetheless, liability may not be imposed merely
because projections are negligently made unless recklessness is shown. In re Digital Equip. Corp.
See. Litig., [1984-85 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 91,991 (D. Mass. 1985).
155. 744 F.2d 978 (3d Cir. 1984).
Number 2]
Washington University Open Scholarship
464 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 64:425
more reliable sources of information. 156
In Flynn, however, the court did not believe that the disputed informa-
tion met the requirements of the test since it lacked reliability, the
preparer was not sufficiently expert, and there was insufficient basis in
fact for the asset valuations.1 57
The test announced in Flynn follows the TSC materiality standard.
Presumably, reasonable shareholders would not desire access to informa-
tion that did not meet the Flynn test, i.e., information that was too sub-
jective, that was prepared by an unqualified person, that was taken out of
context and that was not generally reliable, and such information should
not be considered material. Presumably, there will be many instances in
which soft information will be reliable and when insiders rely on such
soft information, such reliance should be prima facie evidence as to its
materiality. Although the Flynn test is difficult to apply in that it re-
quires balancing of various factors, a policy favoring disclosure in partic-
ular instances seems more consistent with the underlying spirit of the
securities laws in its emphasis on the ability of the investor to make his or
her own evaluation, than is a policy which underestimates the ability of
investors to fend for themselves, even if they have access to full
information. 158
156. Id. at 988. See also Denison Mines Ltd. v. Fibreboard Corp., 388 F. Supp. 812, 819 (D.
Del. 1974) ("To conclude.., that no asset valuations need be disclosed under any circumstances is
to paint with too broad a brush. In the cases cited, the valuations of assets involved the exercise of a
substantial amount of subjective judgment in the selection of data and in the weighing of the infor-
mation selected as relevant. In each case the court noted the subjective judgmental element of the
appraisal process. Where the assets involved admit of a reasonably objective evaluation, however, a
different result has obtained."); Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808 (D. Del. 1951), modi-
fied, 235 F.2d 369 (3d Cir. 1956) (when corporate purchasers of minority shareholders' shares failed
to disclose plan to liquidate the corporation and that the market value of assets had risen substan-
tially above book value, and the market value could be ascertained with reasonable certainty, the
defendants had the duty to disclose market value).
157. Flynn, 744 F.2d at 988-90.
158. See South Coast Services Corp. v. Santa Ana Valley, 669 F.2d 1265, 1275-76 (9th Cir. 1982)
(one dissent):
The policy reflecting a solicitous regard for shareholders who might place indiscriminate
trust in estimates of questionable reliability, had its genesis in the Commission's early effort
... to protect investors from certain companies' practices of luring the unsuspecting with
overstatement of assets in registration statements.... The Commission's mandate 'to stem
the speculative tide whenever necessary,' . .. called for measures and policies designed to
correct certain abuses thought to have initiated the stock market collapse of 1929 and the
ensuring economic depression, but ill suited to fulfillment of other aspects of the Act's
remedial purposes. Attainment of one of those goals, to promote fair corporate suffrage, is
inhibited by a policy that counsels withholding material information from shareholders
voting on a merger proposal.
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D. Alternative Possible Transactions
Another troublesome problem which illustrates the tension between
"hard facts" and "soft information" is whether management must dis-
close possible transactions which are alternatives to the one proposed.
For example, suppose that the shareholders of Corporation X are voting
on a management-sponsored proposal to sell all of X's assets to Corpora-
tion Y or to merge with Corporation Y. Must X's management disclose
in its proxy statement that it has received offers from other potential
purchasers?
Under most circumstances, "management is not required to discuss
the panoply of possible alternatives to the course of action it is propos-
ing."1 59 For example, if management proposes liquidation, it need not
present alternate methods to the shareholders, each with different tax
consequences, and leave the final choice up to them.16 0 While its failure
to make the best choice among different alternatives may be grounds for
an action under state law, such a failure is no violation of federal law.
However, in merger or liquidation cases, the courts are united in hold-
ing that management does have a duty under section 14(a) to disclose
alternative firm offers from other potential purchasers. 61  This is espe-
cially so when the alternative offers are more favorable to the sharehold-
ers than the one proposed by management. The duty is confined to firm
offers and does not extend to alternative offers which are tentative or
speculative. A single telephone call by a potential purchaser suggesting a
possible purchase, without follow-up, is not firm enough to require dis-
159. District 65, UAW v. Harper & Row [1983-84 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
99,608 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Umbriac v. Kaiser, 467 F. Supp. 548, 553 (D. Nev. 1979).
160. 467 F. Supp. at 553 ("The failure to disclose that KIC might garner a 'control premium' or
accomplish the liquidation in tax-free fashion was immaterial as a matter of law."). See also Koppel
v. Wien, 575 F. Supp. 960, 968-69 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), aff'd, 743 F.2d 129 (2d Cir. 1984) (defendant
need not have disclosed that a more financially advantageous brokerage deal could have been ob-
tained to sell joint venture's assets).
161. See South Coast Services Corp. v. Santa Ana Valley, 669 F.2d 1265, 1273 (9th Cir. 1982)
("Firm offers from other potential purchasers, if they are more favorable than the offer being en-
dorsed by management, must be disclosed in proxy materials soliciting shareholder approval of a
proposed sale of corporate assets."); Gerstle, 478 F.2d at 1294-95 ("The matter of disclosing 'firm
offers', however, may well stand differently. Such offers, emanating from outside sources, do not
have the potential of overstatement of prospects at the instance of management that has so alarmed
the SEC about appraisals. Perhaps more important, there has not been a general understanding
within the legal and accounting professions that reference to such offers in a proxy statement would
not be permitted, as has existed with respect to appraisals."); United States Smelting, Ref., & Mining
Co. v. Clevite Corp., [1969-70 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 92,691, at 99,051-54
(N.D. Ohio 1968) (failure to inform shareholders of second merger offer at higher price).
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closure. 6 2 Similarly, if the directors have reasonable grounds to believe
that an offer has been withdrawn, if the offer had such unreasonable con-
ditions attached to it that it was unrealistic, or if it was a mere step in
negotiations, then it need not be disclosed. 163
On the other hand, one might argue that disclosure of information
about the mere interest of other companies, even if not at an advanced
stage, may be of concern to shareholders in deciding how to vote. Dis-
closure of potential offers, even tentative ones, helps shareholders gain an
awareness of the intensity of demand, the value of the corporation's as-
sets, "and the adequacy of the offer under consideration."'' In some
situations a single communication from another purchaser (such as one
from a large multinational corporation to a much smaller one) may be
significant enough to disclose to all shareholders, particularly if the sec-
ond offer is one which could be pursued further if management took the
opportunity to do so.
E. Characterization of Transaction as Fair or Unfair
A final area illustrating the tension between facts and opinion involves
whether a transaction should be characterized as fair or unfair. The few
cases addressing this issue typically state that all that need be disclosed
are the facts from which a stockholder may draw his or her own
conclusion. 16-
162. See South Coast Services Corp., 669 F.2d at 1273; Scott v. Multi-Amp Corp., 386 F. Supp.
44, 65 (D.N.J. 1974).
163. See South Coast Services Corp., 669 F.2d at 1273; Alameda Oil Co. v. Ideal Basic Indus.,
337 F. Supp. 194, 195 (D. Colo. 1972). As to when disclosure must be made while negotiations for
acquisitions are in progress, compare Greenfield v. Heublein, Inc., 742 F.2d 751 (3d Cir. 1984)
(disclosure need not be made until the negotiations have determined the price and structure of the
transaction) with In re Carnation Co., Sec. Exch. Act Rel. No. 22214, [1984-85 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 83,801 (1985) (fixing of price and structure are not necessarily prerequi-
sites for determining duty of disclosure). Cf. Michaels v. Michaels, [Current Volume] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 92,203 (7th Cir. 1985).
164. South Coast Services, Corp., 669 F.2d at 1277.
165. Selk v. St. Paul Ammonia Products, Inc., 597 F.2d 635 (8th Cir. 1979); Nutis v. Penn
Merchandising Corp., 610 F. Supp. 1573 (E.D. Pa. 1985); Dofflemyer v. W.F. Hall Printing Co., 558
F. Supp. 372 (D. Del. 1983); Nemo v. Allen, 466 F. Supp. 192, 195 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), modified, 743
F.2d 129 (2d Cir. 1984). See also Popkin v. Bishop, 464 F.2d 714, 719-20 (2d Cir. 1972) ("Section
10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule lOb-5 are designed principally to impose a duty to disclose and
inform rather than to become enmeshed in passing judgment on information elicited."). Cf. SEC v.
Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 843 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied sub. nor Kline v.
SEC, 394 U.S. 976 (1969) (federal securities law requires "nothing more than disclosure of basic
facts so that outsiders may draw upon their own evaluative experience in reaching their own invest-
ment decisions").
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However, in some situations a fairness opinion may be required. Thus
under rule 13e-3, covering "going-private" transactions, management is
required to include in its proxy statement a statement "whether the is-
suer or affiliate ... reasonably believes that the Rule 13e-3 transaction is
fair or unfair to unaffiliated security holders." The issuer must also
"[d]iscuss in reasonable detail the material factors upon which the belief
stated ... is based and, to the extent practicable, the weight assigned to
each such factor."
166
The factors include current and historical market price of the stock;
the book, liquidation, and going concern values of the corporation, and
the price paid in previous repurchases.167 In such cases, if the supporting
data is materially misleading, the issuer could be liable under several the-
odes, including a violation of section 14(a).
Aside from rule 13e-3 transactions, if a corporation includes a fairness
statement in its proxy statement to increase its chances of obtaining
shareholder approval, one could argue by analogy to rule 13e-3 that
management should not be permitted to offer a mere conclusory state-
ment, but should have to provide supporting information. The extent of
the supporting information should depend on the particular circum-
stances. For example, as the First Circuit Court of Appeals suggested in
the Pavlidis case,168 if there is a proxy contest, management's statement
of fairness may not have to be supported by as much information as
when a transaction is unilaterally proposed by management. If manage-
ment obtains a fairness opinion from an outside and independent source,
the outsider should be independent in fact and any fees which the out-
sider receives should be disclosed.
169
IV. SCIENTER-THE STANDARD OF CARE
Most courts which have considered the appropriate standard of care
required by the proxy rules have rejected the suggestion that, since ac-
tions under rule lOb-5 require a showing of scienter or something more
166. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-100, Item 8, discussed in Radol v. Thomas, 534 F. Supp. 1302, 1314-17
(S.D. Ohio 1982).
167 Id.
168. See Pavlidis v. New England Patriots Football Club, Inc., 737 F.2d 1227, 1231 (Ist Cir.
1984).
169. See Radol, 534 F. Supp. at 1314 (characterization of financial advisor as independent did
not violate rule 14a-9 even though advisor played a role in the negotiation of merger and its fee was
contingent on outcome, since proxy statement contained extensive disclosures about advisor's role
and the fee arrangements were adequately discussed).
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than ordinary negligence, such as recklessness or behavior more heinous
than that, similar principles should apply to the preparation of proxy
statements. 70 Thus the great weight of authority appears to be that, at
least in actions by shareholders against an issuer, i.e., the corporation
distributing a negligently prepared proxy statement, ordinary negligence
should suffice.171 In doing so, courts have relied upon the conspicuous
differences in the statutory language of sections 14(a) and 10(b), the legis-
lative history of these provisions, similar differences in the language of
rule 14a-9 and rule lOb-5, and the roles which they play in the overall
legislative scheme.
Section 14(a) gives the Commission broad regulatory authority to pre-
scribe rules governing the solicitation of proxies. Unlike section 10(b), it
makes no mention of manipulation or deception and thus extends well
beyond conventional fraud.
The differences between rule 14a-9 and rule lOb-5 are obvious, inten-
tional, and pronounced. The former states that proxy materials must not
contain a false or misleading statement, or omit any material fact that
would make the statements false or misleading. 72 The latter speaks pri-
170. See, e.g., Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680 (1980); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185
(1976).
171. See, e.g., Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281 (2d Cir. 1973); Fradkin v. Ernst,
571 F. Supp. 829 (N.D. Ohio 1983); Shidler v. All American Life & Fin. Corp., [1982 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,875 (S.D. Iowa 1982), aff'd FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH)
92,326 (8th Cir. 1985); Halpern v. Armstrong, 491 F. Supp. 365 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); National Home
Products, Inc. v. Gray, 416 F. Supp. 1293 (D. Del. 1976); Berman v. Thomson, 403 F. Supp. 695
(N.D. Ill. 1975); Sirota v. Econo-Car Int'l, Inc., 61 F.R.D. 604 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd, 556 F.2d 676
(2d Cir. 1977); Gould v. American Hawaiian S.S. Co., 351 F. Supp. 853 (D. Del. 1972), rey'd on
other grounds, 535 F.2d 761 (3d Cir. 1976); Norte & Co. v. Huffines, 288 F. Supp. 855 (S.D.N.Y.
1968), aff'd in part and remanded in part, 416 F.2d 1189 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 989
(1970); Richland v. Crandall, 262 F. Supp. 538 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); cf Mendell v. Greenberg, 612 F.
Supp. 1543, 1548 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (court assuming the point, with little or no discussion, for pur-
poses of ruling on motion to dismiss complaint); but see Adams v. Standard Knitting Mills, Inc., 623
F.2d 422 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1067 (1980) (discussed in infra text accompanying note
189 and holding that scienter is required for an action against accountants, the court not passing
upon whether scienter is also required in an action against the company or its officers or directors);
Mader v. Armel, 461 F.2d 1123 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1023 (1972) (suggesting that scien-
ter might be required for an action against outside directors). For discussion of the scienter require-
ment, see Telly, Proxies and the Modern Corporation: Scienter Under Sections 14(a) and 10(b) ofthe
Securities Exchange Act, 19 TuLSA L.J. 491 (1984); Note, Proxy Regulation: Ensuring Accurate
Disclosure Through a Negligence Standard, 50 FORDHAM L. REv. 1423 (1982).
172. Rule 14a-9(a) states in part that no proxy statement shall contain "any statement which, at
the time and in the light of the circumstances under which it is made, is false or misleading with
respect to any material fact, or which omits to state any material fact necessary in order to make the
statements therein not false or misleading .. " 17 C.F.R. § 140.14a-9 (1981).
[Vol. 64:425
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maily in terms of prohibiting fraud or deceit, although, like rule 14-9, it
also prohibits so-called "half truths." '73 The differences are apparent not
only from the rules themselves but also from their differing functions.
The primary purpose of the proxy rules is to insure accurate preparation
of proxy materials so as to inform investors adequately and enable them
to vote their shares in an intelligent manner. The primary purpose of
rule lOb-5, on the other hand, is to prohibit fraud or deceit, including
"half truths," in connection with the purchase or sale of securities in
interstate commerce or by use of the mails or facilities of national securi-
ties exchanges. The differences in language and function justify different
standards of culpability. 174
The legislative history of the proxy provisions indicates that Congress
had become concerned that "[tloo often proxies are solicited without ex-
planation to the stockholder of the real nature of the questions for which
authority to cast his vote is sought." '75 Thus "[flair corporate sufferage
is an important right that should attach to every equity security bought
on a public exchange"' 76 and section 14(a) of the Exchange Act was
therefore intended to "control the conditions under which proxies may
be solicited with a view to preventing the recurrence of abuses which...
173. Rule lOb-5 states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any facility of any national
securities exchange, (1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, (2) to make
any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order
to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were
made, not misleading, or (3) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1981).
174. See Richland v. Crandell, 262 F. Supp. 538 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), in which the court explained
how the different language of the two rules requires differing standards of culpability:
Section 10(b) uses language associated with an intent to defraud, i.e., "any manipulative or
deceptive device or contrivance." Section 14(a) and S.E.C. Regulation 14a-9 thereunder,
however, does [sic] not contain any such language. It outlaws the use of any proxy state-
ment that is "false or misleading with respect to any material fact, or which omits to state
any material fact necessary in order to make the statement therein not false or misleading
***." Accordingly the Court is of the view, and so charged the jury upon submitting to it
the class action suit for deliberation, that plaintiffs were required only to prove that the
defendants knew or should have known of the statements and material facts, and the Court
refused to charge that an intent to defraud need be shown.
Id. at 553 n.12 (citations omitted). See also Gerstle, 478 F.2d, at 1298-99; Gerstle, 298 F. Supp. 66,
97 (E.D.N.Y. 1969), modified, 478 F.2d 1281 (2d Cir. 1973).
175. S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1934).
176. H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1934).
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[had] frustrated the free exercise of the voting rights of stockholders."'' 77
It is thus not surprising that "the scope of the rulemaking authority
granted under section 14(a) is broad, extending to all proxy regulation
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of
investors and not limited by any words connoting fraud or deception."' 178
Moreover, since negligence is sufficient for tort liability under the com-
mon law when a person supplies false information to another intending
to influence a transaction in which he has a pecuniary interest,'79 it seems
highly unlikely that Congress, in enacting section 14(a), or the Commis-
sion in promulgating rule 14a-9, intended that those provisions incorpo-
rate a lesser standard of liability. Although, to be sure, section 18(a) of
the Exchange Act, which provides for express civil liability in connection
with false reports or other documents filed with the Commission, enables
a defendant to establish his "good faith" or lack of knowledge as a de-
fense, it is also equally true that "most of the documents within the scope
of section 18 are not distributed to stockholders for the purpose of induc-
ing action . . ."' Thus proxy materials are disclosure documents of a
specialized type in that they contemplate action by those for whom they
are intended. In this respect they resemble prospectuses. If Congress
provided for a standard of "due diligence" as regards the preparation of
prospectuses, it seems unlikely that it also intended that a lesser stan-
dard, one requiring "scienter" prevail with respect to the preparation of
proxy materials. 18' Moreover, the primary reason for requiring "scien-
177. Id. at 14.
178. Gerstle, 478 F.2d at 1299.
179. Id. at 1300, citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (Tent. Draft No. 12, 1966);
Gediman v. Anheuser Busch, Inc., 299 F.2d 537, 543-46 (2d Cir. 1962); W. PROSSER, TORTS § 107,
at 706-09 (4th ed. 1971).
180. Gerstle, 478 F.2d at 1299 n.18.
181. See Securities Act of 1933 § 11(b)(3). The overall standard, for persons other than the
issuer, is that of "reasonable investigation, reasonable ground to believe... [and actual belief]" in
the truth and accuracy of the material in the registration statement. There is strict liability for the
issuer (subject to a defense that the misrepresentation or omission was not material) and the issuer is
therefore virtually the insurer of the accuracy of the registration statement. Although it has been
argued that a similar standard (i.e., strict liability) should apply to an issuer preparing proxy materi-
als, the courts have thus far rejected the suggestion, requiring that negligence be shown, as with
other possible defendants, such as directors, officers and others. See Shidler v. All American Life &
Fin. Corp., [Current Volume] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 92,326 at 92,169-70 (8th Cir. 1985)
(pointing out that prospectuses are usually addressed to those who are making their initial invest-
ment in an issuer and who therefore cannot be expected to be as well-informed about its affairs as
those for whom proxy materials are prepared, persons who are continuing investors in a corporation
and who can therefore be expected to be more familiar with its activities; accordingly a stricter
standard should be applied with respect to the preparation of prospectuses).
[Vol. 64:425
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ter" in connection with rule lOb-5, namely to reconcile it with the other
provisions of the securities laws which provide remedies to purchasers of
securities without requiring scienter,182 does not exist with regard to sec-
tion 14(a), which is restricted to proxy materials. In addition, the cover-
age of rule lOb-5 is broader than that of rule 14a-9 in that the former
embraces situations where corporations make statements concerning
their affairs without necessarily being under a legal obligation to do so.
To impose too high a standard of care in such situations would discour-
age corporate candor, especially if there is no upper limit on the measure
of damages. 183
The case law following Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder'84 confirms the
foregoing analysis. Thus, in Gould v. American-Hawaiian Steamship
Co., I" one of the issues was the appropriate standard of liability applica-
ble in an action under rule 14a-9 to an outside, i.e., nonmanagement,
director. In rejecting the defendant's argued analogy between rule 14a-9
and rule 1Ob-5 and his suggestion that the scienter requirement of
Hochfelder should control, the court stated that if an analogy were to be
drawn between various rules, it would:
agree with the district court that section 14(a) and Rule 14a-9(a) may be
more closely analogized to section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933 ...
which deals with civil liability for false registration statements .... Since
section 11 of the Securities Act clearly establishes negligence as the test for
determining liability, the parallel between the two sections would strongly
support adoption of negligence as the standard under section 14(a). 186
In addition, the court reaffirmed a point already made in Gerstle 87 by
observing that, "unlike sections 10(b) and 18 of the [Exchange] Act,
which encompass activity in numerous and diverse areas of securities
markets and corporate management, section 14(a) is specially limited to
materials used in soliciting proxies."'188
Only a scattering of cases following Gerstle and Gould have suggested
the propriety of a scienter requirement with regard to rule 14a-9. This
182. See Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 384 (1983); Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S.
680 (1980); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
183. Gerstle, 478 F.2d at 1300.
184. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
185. 535 F.2d 761 (3d Cir. 1976).
186. Id. at 777. Indeed, the analogy between § 14(a) and § 11 of the Securities Act of 1933 has
led to an argument that issuers should have strict liability under § 14(a). See supra note 181.
187. 478 F.2d at 1299 n.18. See supra text accompanying note 180.
188. Gould, 535 F.2d at 778. See supra text accompanying note 180.
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minority view appears to prevail primarily in the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals which, in Adams v. Standard Knitting Mills, Inc.,' chose to
follow an earlier pre-Hochfelder holding which required scienter 190 The
case actually involved liability of a controlling party under section 20(a)
of the Exchange Act, obviously a different issue from whether scienter
should be required for primary liability under rule 14a-9. In Adams, the
later of the two cases, a North Carolina hosiery manufacturer,
Chadbourn, Inc., merged with Standard Knitting Mills, Inc., a small
publicly held textile manufacturer. In soliciting approval of the merger,
Standard's proxy materials contained Chadbourn's financial statements
which had been prepared by the latter's accountants.
Approximately one year after the merger, Chadbourn's sales of hosiery
plummeted unexpectedly, resulting in substantial losses and wiping out
Chadbourn's retained earnings with the result that it was not able to re-
deem or make payments on its preferred shares held by former Standard
shareholders. The shareholders then brought an action for damages
against the accounting firm under rule lOb-5 and 14a-9, alleging that the
financial statements were false and misleading. Although the court held
that scienter was required for determining the accountant's liability
under either rule lOb-5 or rule 14a-9, after carefully reserving the ques-
tion of the liability of the corporation itself,191 the court confessed that it
was "influenced by the fact that the accountant here, unlike the corpo-
rate issuer, does not directly benefit from the proxy vote and is not in
privity with the stockholder"'1 92 and went on to observe that "[u]nlike
the corporate issuer, the preparation of financial statements to be ap-
pended to proxies and other reports is the daily fare of accountants, and
the accountant's potential liability for relatively minor mistakes would be
enormous under a negligence standard."'' 93 Thus, entirely apart from the
propriety of its holding that scienter is applicable in rule 14a-9 actions,
the case is clearly distinguishable from other decisions which dispense
189. 623 F.2d 422 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1067 (1980), noted in Comment, Misleading
Proxy Statements-Outside Accountants Can Be Held Liable Under Rule 14a-9 Only Upon a Showing
of Scienter, 56 NOTRE DAME LAW. 579 (1981); Recent Development, Liability of Accountants for
Proxy Violations-The Appropriate Standard of Culpability, 56 WASH. L. REV. 743 (1981).
190. Mader v. Armel, 461 F.2d 1123 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1023 (1972).
191. Adams, 623 F.2d at 428.
192. Id. Cf Gerstle, 478 F.2d at 1298 n.16, where the court reserved the question of the proper
standard to be applied in actions against persons other than the issuer itself or in favor of persons
who traded on the basis of information provided in the proxy statement.
193. 623 F.2d at 428.
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with scienter in actions brought against issuers or other direct benefi-
ciaries of a proxy solicitation. Added to this is the court's dubious dis-
cussion of the legislative history of section 14(a), which suggests a clear
nonsequitur, namely that, since Congress was also aware of instances in
which proxies had been solicited in a fraudulent or at least reckless man-
ner, it arguably intended only to prohibit fraudulent or recklessly pre-
pared proxy materials rather than to outlaw negligently prepared ones.194
Finally, the court's analogy to actions under section 14(e) is misplaced
since the language of that provision more closely resembles rule lOb-5
than it does rule 14a-9. t95 It is thus apparent that the Adams case is
doubtful authority for the proposition that scienter should be required
for actions under rule 14a-9. Indeed, a later district court in the same
jurisdiction has refused to require scienter in a rule 14a-9 action brought
against corporate directors, rather than accountants. 196
V. CONCLUSION
A plaintiff need not establish that he personally was deceived by an
allegedly misleading proxy solicitation if he can demonstrate that other
shareholders were misled, resulting in authorization of a transaction
which led to the plaintiff's injury. In this sense personal "reliance"
should not be required to determine standing to sue.
Even though reliance is not necessary, a plaintiff must still establish
causation. Thus it must be shown that the transaction forming the basis
of the suit, and allegedly causing harm to the plaintiff, was itself subject
to shareholder approval and that the misleading proxy solicitation oc-
curred in seeking authorization for that transaction. When directors
have been elected as a result of misleading proxy materials, breaches of
fiduciary duty occurring thereafter, although arguably having a "but for"
causal relationship with the prior election, may be remedied only under
state law, although claims based on state law may occasionally be re-
solved by a federal court under the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction. It
should not be a defense to a majority shareholder engaged in a mislead-
194, Id. at 429-30.
195. Id. at 430. See Note, Negligence v. Scienter: The Proper Standard of Liability for Violations
of the Antifraud Provisions Regulating Tender Offers and Proxy Solicitations Under The Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 41 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1045, 1061 (1984).
196. Fradkin v. Ernst, 571 F. Supp. 829 (N.D. Ohio 1983) (following Gerstle and Gould and
restricting Adams to its own facts).
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ing proxy solicitation that it would have had power to authorize the
transaction in any event by voting the controlling block.
The standard for determining materiality for the purpose of the proxy
rules is the same as that for rule lOb-5, namely whether there is a sub-
stantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider the fact
important in deciding how to vote or that disclosure of the fact would
have significantly altered the "total mix" of information made available.
Generally this means that only "facts" need be disclosed. A proponent
need not disclose its subjective motivation or characterize a proposed
transaction as fair or unfair. Similarly, one need not disclose alternative
possible transactions unless in a liquidation, merger, or other acquisition,
management has received firm offers from other prospective purchasers,
in which case disclosure is required. Although certain types of "soft"
information, such as earnings projections and estimates of current value,
are not generally required, they are nonetheless permissible and may give
rise to liability if recklessly made.
In sharp contrast to actions brought under rule lOb-5, suits based on
misleading proxy solicitations need not show scienter and need only es-
tablish that proxy materials were negligently prepared. A possible excep-
tion to this rule has developed with respect to actions brought against
outside accountants, where scienter has sometimes been required.
Whether the exception will eventually broaden to include actions
brought against "outside" directors is a matter of conjecture at the pres-
ent time.
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